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CYBERLAW 2.0 
 
Jacqueline D. Lipton* 
 
Abstract 
 
In the early days of the Internet, Judge Frank Easterbrook 
famously dismissed the idea of an emerging field of cyberspace 
law as akin to a “law of the horse”— a pastiche of unrelated 
legal principles tied together only by virtue of applying to the 
Internet, having no unifying principles that would teach us 
anything meaningful.  This article revisits Easterbrook’s 
assertions with the benefit of hindsight.  It suggests that 
subsequent case law and legislative developments in fact do 
support a distinct cyberlaw field.  It introduces the novel 
argument that cyberlaw is a global “law of the intermediated 
information exchange.”  In other words, online law is unified 
by the fact that everything that occurs in cyberspace is an 
information exchange intermediated by one or more third 
parties - search engines, social networks, Internet Services 
Providers etc.  Thus, cyberlaw is essentially about regulating 
communications amongst individuals, and apportioning 
liability between communicators and those who facilitate 
communication.  Accepting this premise, one can identify a 
foundation – and set of unifying principles - for the field.  This 
article advocates building up from this foundation to facilitate 
the development of a more cohesive, systematic and predictable 
set of rules for online governance.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Law students in the 1990s flocked to enroll in new courses described 
variously as Internet law, cyberspace law, cyberlaw, and information law,1  
                                                 
*
 Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Research, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law, 11075 East Boulevard, Cleveland, Ohio, 
44106 (Email:  JDL14@case.edu).  The author would like to thank Dean Lawrence 
Mitchell, Professor Nancy Kim, and Professor Cassandra Robertson for comments on an 
earlier draft of this article.  All mistakes and omissions are, of course, my own. 
1
 RAYMOND KU and JACQUELINE LIPTON, CYBERSPACE LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS, 
16-17 (3 ed, 2010) (“The study of cyberspace law is … the study of the regulation of 
information in a world interlinked and mediated by computer networks …. In other words, 
the study of cyberspace law is the study of whether traditionally separate substantive laws 
that dealt with information should give way to a new overarching category of information 
law.”); Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for Information Law and Policy, 82 OREGON LAW 
REVIEW 695 (2003) (describing similiarities and differences between recognizing 
2 CYBERLAW 2.0 [9-Aug-11 
despite criticisms that these courses were nothing more than a cyberspace 
“law of the horse”.2  Judge Frank Easterbrook had famously argued in 1996 
that examination of property rights in cyberspace was no more than a 
survey of disparate legal principles related only by the fact that they were 
applied to the Internet.3  He likened cyberspace law to a “law of the horse” 
on the basis that that field would include various principles of tort, contract 
and environmental law related only by the fact that they were applied to 
horses.4  There would be no distinct unifying principles grounding the 
endeavor that would illuminate our thinking about the law more generally.5   
 
Despite these criticisms, cyberlaw courses continue to be taught in law 
schools around the world.6  Although the contours of the field have 
remained amorphous, the idea of cyberlaw has resonated with a large group 
of legal scholars.7  This article questions why cyberlaw has maintained its 
traction despite Easterbrook’s criticisms, and examines whether there may, 
in fact, be a unifying set of principles that underlie the field.  In particular, 
the article takes advantage of the years of judicial and legislative 
developments since Easterbrook’s comments to consider whether more than 
a decade of legal development now supports the field.  In the author’s view, 
new developments not only support the existence of a cyberlaw field, but 
more importantly require a re-organization of the field to better encapsulate 
what is unique and unifying about it. 
 
It is easy to miss what is unifying about cyberlaw because the relevant 
principles appear in different guises across a variety of legal fields, notably 
                                                                                                                            
“cyberlaw” and “information law” as distinct fields of study). 
2
 See, for example, Frank Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (famously arguing that cyberspace law amounted to nothing 
more than a “law of the horse”). 
3
  KU and LIPTON, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining the “law of the horse” metaphor as 
suggesting that “Internet law has no truly distinct value aside from being one of many 
potential areas for applying every legal discipline from antitrust to zoning law” to the 
Internet). 
4
  Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 207 (“the best way to learn the law applicable to 
specialized endeavors is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; 
others deal with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of 
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows. Any 
effort to collect these strands into a course on ‘The Law of the Horse’ is doomed to be 
shallow and to miss unifying principles”). 
5
  Id. 
6
  See, for example, Jessica Litman, List of Cyberlaw Syllabi (available at http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~jdlitman/classes/cyber/courses.html, last viewed on August 1, 2011). 
7
  So much so, in fact, that 2011 saw the inception of a new annual works in progress 
conference dedicated to the cyberlaw field:  http://law.scu.edu/hightech/internet-law-
scholarship.cfm, last viewed on August 8, 2011. 
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torts, intellectual property law, constitutional law, and criminal law.  The 
aim of this article is to draw key principles together to make the case for 
cyberlaw. The author argues that the main concepts around which cyberlaw 
might be arranged are: examining Internet intermediary liability for the 
wrongful conduct of others; identifying appropriate behavioral norms 
specific to online interactions; addressing jurisdictional challenges specific 
to the Internet context; identifying a concept of compensable harm in online 
disputes; and, as a corollary, quantifying damages for online wrongs.   
 
These concepts derive from the underlying nature of the Internet:  a 
global communications medium where communications are facilitated by 
intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), virtual world 
operators, online gaming platforms, social network operators, web-hosting 
services, search engines, and payments systems.  What is unique about 
cyberlaw is that it is the law of the intermediated information exchange.  
The unifying features of cyberlaw relate to the fact that the field deals 
purely with information exchanges and that those exchanges are always 
facilitated by one or more intermediaries.  Nothing happens online that is 
not a form of intermediated information exchange.  Thus, the cyberlaw field 
must focus, as no other field has before, on developing principles that 
regulate how we communicate with each other globally in a variety of 
spheres of activity (social, commercial, artistic) utilizing intermediated 
digital technologies.  
 
Part I provides a history of cyberlaw, including prominent critiques of 
the field.  Part II focuses on Internet intermediary liability as a central tenet 
of cyberlaw.  If cyberlaw is a law of the intermediated information 
exchange, the role of the intermediary must take on paramount importance.  
Part III addresses online behavioral norms.  Cyberspace interactions involve 
different behavioral norms from those that have developed in the physical 
world and the law must come to reflect those norms.8  Part IV turns to 
                                                 
8
   Just as “real world” tort law embodies reasonableness standards (such as the 
omniscient “reasonable person”) cyberlaw too should develop notions of reasonable online 
conduct.  However, because cyberspace interactions are pure information exchanges and do 
not involve physical conduct, reasonableness standards online cannot be based on spatial 
analogs drawn from the physical world.  Privacy law, for example, has developed the 
concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” based on physical doors, walls, fences, 
and locks:  DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 71-74 (2008) (describing the 
concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” as it has developed in American Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and privacy tort law) [hereinafter, Understanding Privacy].  
This kind of “reasonableness” standard does not easily translate to cyberspace:  Patricia 
Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARVARD JOURNAL OF 
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 4 (2007) (noting that traditional American conceptions of 
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jurisdictional questions.  It examines the extent to which cyberlaw has 
required, or may yet require, a reconsideration of traditional private 
international law principles.  It suggests that the global nature of the Internet 
– requiring a jurisdictional inquiry in a majority of cases – may lead to a 
situation where jurisdictional boundaries serve routinely to bar substantive 
relief to individual litigants.  The author argues that more predictable ex 
ante jurisdictional rules must be developed to allow for more effective 
determination of substantive legal rights online.9  If the jurisdictional 
hurdles can be dealt with more effectively and predictably, judges will be 
able to focus more fully on developing substantive rights and remedies. 
 
Part V examines the nature of harms and remedies online.  Online harms 
deriving from information exchanges are predominantly reputational, 
emotional, and psychological.  These kinds of harms are notably different to 
the kinds of harms traditionally addressed by, say, tort and intellectual 
property laws.  Traditional laws have focused much more on economic 
harms often deriving from physical damages to a person or her property.  
The cyberlaw field needs to develop ways to identify and address harms 
arising from pure information exchanges and to effectively remedy those 
harms.   
 
The author concludes in Part VI that by drawing together the issues 
discussed in Parts II to V, a clearer picture of a distinct cyberlaw field 
emerges, with its own set of unifying principles.  While parties would 
continue to litigate disputes under existing laws, development of a cyberlaw 
field alongside those existing fields would facilitate the creation of more 
cohesive, harmonized, and predictable rules for Internet governance.   
 
I.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF CYBERSPACE  
 
A.  In The Beginning… 
 
Most of us can no longer conceive of a world without the Internet, let 
alone the various handheld wireless devices – smart phones, iPads, and the 
like - enabling connectivity from virtually anywhere around the globe.  
Nevertheless, the previous generation – including many of today’s law 
professors - witnessed the birth of the Internet.  Some of us still remember a 
time when there was no cyberlaw course in the law school curriculum.  
                                                                                                                            
privacy do not translate well to the “spaceless” environment of the Internet).   
9
   Cassandra Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 
(draft on file with the author) (arguing for a clearer ex ante jurisdictional rule in Internet 
defamation cases). 
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Variously entitled cyberlaw, cyberspace law, or Internet law, these courses 
are now a staple of most upper level curricula.   
 
Despite the apparent permanence of cyberlaw courses, no one has yet 
accurately explained the nature of the field.  Cyberlaw casebooks focus 
variously on topics such as copyright and trademark law, First Amendment, 
privacy, jurisdictional problems, electronic contracting, regulatory 
competence of domestic legislatures, and private ordering.10   
 
It was in the face of the uncertainties surrounding the appropriate 
boundaries of the field that Judge Frank Easterbrook made his famous “law 
of the horse” comments at the University of Chicago.11  In remarks prepared 
following an invitation to comment on property law in cyberspace, Judge 
Easterbrook cited comments made by Dean Gerhard Casper, ex dean of the 
University of Chicago School of Law, to the effect that Casper was proud 
that Chicago did not offer a course in “the law of the horse”.12   
 
In likening cyberspace law to a “law of the horse”, Easterbrook echoed 
Casper’s concerns.  Easterbrook noted specifically that courses involving 
the cross-sterilization of several fields, such as law and technology, tended 
to offer the worst of both worlds.13  They would be doomed to be taught by 
professors who “knew little about either field”.14  Easterbrook also opined 
that the most effective way to learn laws as they might apply to specialized 
endeavors is to study rules of general application.15  Otherwise, any new 
field that emerged would lack unifying principles that might illuminate 
anything meaningful about the law more generally.16 
 
Easterbrook’s comments were met with a variety of responses defending 
the existence of cyberspace law from a number of conceptual perspectives.  
In a well known response to Easterbrook in the Harvard Law Review, 
Professor Lawrence Lessig argued that cyberlaw did, in fact, illuminate the 
                                                 
10
  See, for example, KU and LIPTON, supra note 1; MARK LEMLEY, PETER MENELL, 
ROBERT MERGES and PAMELA SAMUELSON, SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW (3 ed, 2006);  
GERALD R. FERRERA, STEPHEN D. LICHTENSTEIN, MARGO E. K. REDER, ROBERT BIRD and 
WILLIAM T. SCHIANO, CYBERLAW:  TEXT AND CASES (2003); PETER MAGGS, JOHN SOMA 
and JAMES SPROWL, INTERNET AND COMPUTER LAW:  CASES – COMMENTS – QUESTIONS 
(2ed, 2005). 
11
  Easterbrook, supra note 2. 
12
  Id., at 207. 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. 
15
  Id. 
16
  Id., at 207-8. 
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entire law, although not in the way described by Easterbrook.17  Lessig 
acknowledged that cyberlaw might be conceived as a series of disconnected 
tort, contract, and intellectual property problems as a matter of substance.18  
However, he noted that: “there is an important general point that comes 
from thinking in particular about how law and cyberspace connect.”19  This 
general point was not about the substance of the law as it might be applied 
in cyberspace, but rather about the limits on law as a regulator.20 
 
Lessig utilized this insight as a springboard for his well-known work 
that examines the application of a number of regulatory modalities in both 
real space and in cyberspace.  These modalities include law, social norms, 
markets, and architecture.21  In his subsequent work, he has focused on the 
significance of system architecture, or software code, as the key regulatory 
modality for cyberspace.22  Lessig’s insight was that online behavior can be 
more or less completely and almost perfectly regulated by software code to 
an extent that the law could never achieve.23   
 
Professor Raymond Ku took a slightly different approach to 
Easterbrook’s concerns.  While agreeing that one could regard cyberspace 
law as an intersection of a variety of different fields, Ku suggested that 
cyberspace law nevertheless does potentially “illuminate the entire law”. 24  
                                                 
17
  Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 501 (1999) [hereinafter, What Cyberlaw Might Teach]. 
18
  Id, at 502 (“Courses in law school, Easterbrook argued, ‘should be limited to 
subjects that could illuminate the entire law.’ ‘[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to 
specialized endeavors,’ he argued, ‘is to study general rules.’  This ‘the law of cyberspace,’ 
conceived of as torts in cyberspace, contracts in cyberspace, property in cyberspace, etc., 
was not.”) 
19
  Id. 
20
  Id. 
21
 Id., at 503-504 (identifying these four modalities of regulation in both physical 
world and cyberspace contexts). 
22
  LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:  VERSION 2.0 (2 ed, 2006) [hereinafter, CODE 2.0]. 
23
  Lessig, What Cyberlaw Might Teach, supra note 17, at 514 (“I argued that whether 
cyberspace can be regulated is not a function of Nature. It depends, instead, upon its 
architecture, or its code. Its regulability, that is, is a function of its design.”); Joel 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica:  The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998) (“This Article argues, in essence, that the set 
of rules for information flows imposed by technology and communication networks form a 
‘Lex Informatica’ that policymakers must understand, consciously recognize, and 
encourage”); 556 (“policymakers can and should look to Lex Informatica as a useful extra-
legal instrument that may be used to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge 
conventional laws and attempts by governments to regulate across jurisdictional lines”). 
24
  Raymond Ku, Foreword:  A Brave New Cyberworld?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV 125, 
127-128 (2000) (“As lawyers, judges, lawmakers, and scholars, we have an obligation to 
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Ku argued that it was imperative to apply real world laws online to see 
whether they were effective in that context.  In so doing, the opportunity 
would arise to question fundamental legal principles as they have applied in 
the pre-Internet world.25 
 
Despite the flurry of heated debate in the immediate wake of 
Easterbrook’s comments, no one has seriously tackled questions about the 
fundamental nature of cyberlaw since the 1990s.  Cyberlaw courses and 
casebooks continue to comprise piecemeal collections of legal principles – 
tort, contract, antitrust, intellectual property, constitutional law, etc. – as 
applied to the Internet.  An examination of these current approaches to 
cyberlaw suggests that Easterbrook’s concerns may have been well-
founded. 
 
No serious attempts have been made to identify and develop what may 
be unique about cyberlaw as a field of study since the 1990s.  In the 
meantime, other important areas of cyberlaw scholarship have evolved, 
including a body of literature about the extent to which spatial metaphors 
derived from the physical world could – or should – be meaningfully 
applied to cyberspace.26  Another ongoing debate has focused on the 
regulatory competence of domestic governments over the Internet.27  This 
debate ultimately led to the coining of the term “cyberspace 
exceptionalism,” referring to the view that traditional domestic governments 
cannot meaningfully regulate cyberspace and that new systems of regulation 
                                                                                                                            
examine the law and cyberspace and to take part in the discourse on how our cyberworld 
will be regulated.  While Judge Easterbrook is clearly right that this effort requires a 
general understanding of the laws of intellectual property, antitrust, or the First 
Amendment, I disagree with his conclusion that the study of cyberspace does not 
‘illuminate the entire law.’”) 
25
  Id., at 129 (“pioneering our cyberworld and determining the rules and laws that will 
govern, forces us to examine our pre-cyberworld rules as well as our commitment to the 
values that form the foundation for those laws”). 
26
  See, for example, John Perry Barlow, Cyberspace Declaration of Independence 
(1996) (available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html, last viewed on 
August 1, 2011); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital 
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 521 (2003); Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace:  Property in 
Information and Information Systems, 35 U. CHI. L. J. 235 (2003); Julie Cohen, Cyberspace 
As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007). 
27
  See, for example, JACK GOLDSMITH and TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET:  
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2008) (arguing that national governments can and 
do regulate cyberspace effectively); DAVID POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE:  
NOTES ON THE STUDY OF CYBERSPACE (2009) (arguing against domestic governments 
regulating cyberspace). 
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must be developed for online conduct.28   
 
Important as these subsequent debates unquestionably have been, they 
do not answer fundamental questions about the nature and contours of 
cyberlaw as a legal field.  The way in which one approaches these other 
debates will impact the answers to some of the questions posed in this 
article.  However, the focus of this discussion is on examining legal 
developments in cyberspace to tease out unifying threads that will enable us 
to map the contours of a distinct cyberlaw field. 
 
B.  The Nature of Cyberspace:  Global Intermediated Information Exchange 
 
The key features of the Internet that effectively form the cornerstones of 
the following discussion are the fact that: (a) all online conduct involves 
information exchange;29 (b) all online communications are facilitated by 
one or more Internet intermediaries such as ISPs, search engines, gaming 
platforms, and payments systems; and, (c) most online interaction has at 
least the potential for global reach. 
 
No one can go online or participate in online interactions without 
contracting with an ISP.  Once online, the Internet experience is only 
meaningful when one engages in interactions such as online games, social 
networks, virtual worlds, electronic commerce, or searching for items of 
interest.  All of these interactions involve intermediaries such as 
Facebook,30 Flickr,31 MySpace,32 Shutterfly,33 Amazon,34 Google35 etc.  
                                                 
28
  David Post, Governing Cyberspace:  Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 883 (2008) (contrasting cyberspace “exceptionalists” and cyberspace 
“unexceptionalist” with respect to their respective views about cyberspace regulation) 
29
  The information exchange is made possible by hardware and by electrons passing 
through cables, but my suggested focus for cyberlaw is on the informational qualities of the 
exchange rather than the hardware.  A good discussion of confusion between hardware and 
content-based analyses of the Internet that plagued early discussions of Internet law can be 
found in:  Orin Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003). 
30
  Facebook is a popular online social networking service.  See www.facebook.com, 
last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
31
 Flickr is an online photo-sharing service.  See www.flickr.com, last viewed on 
August 1, 2011. 
32
  MySpace is a social networking service and forum for sharing popular culture.  See 
www.myspace.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
33
  Shutterfly is an electronic business engaging in printing photographs and associated 
merchandise for customers as well as providing platforms for sharing photographs.  See 
www.shutterfly.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
34
  Amazon.com is an iconic early experiment in electronic commerce that started as a 
book and music retailer online and has grown to expand into various different kinds of 
online marketplaces.  See www.amazon.com, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
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Internet intermediaries appear at many points within the online experience, 
and they are necessary to enable all online experiences. 
 
Online interactions are basically exchanges of information amongst 
individuals.  The information exchanges may be very sophisticated, such as 
the avatars36 in Second Life37 interacting with each other within a virtual 
environment.  However, no physical interactions ever take place between 
real people online.  Even cybersex – the cyberspace analog of the most 
intimate of physical acts - does not involve actual physical contact between 
individuals.   
 
The fact that everything on the Internet may be described as an 
intermediated information exchange ultimately sets the parameters for 
cyberlaw, and sets cyberlaw apart as a distinct legal field.  Understanding 
cyberlaw means understanding the nature and regulation of an information 
exchange involving more than just the originator and the recipient of a 
communication.  To understand cyberlaw, one must understand the nature 
of the relationships between principal actors in an information exchange, as 
well as their relationships to those who facilitate their exchange.  One must 
also recognize harms and damages that result from communications as 
opposed to physical conduct.  Online harms are likely to implicate a 
victim’s reputation and mental or emotional well-being, rather than causing 
physical or economic damage. 
 
One must further consider the impact of the global nature of the Internet 
on all of these issues.  As most Internet disputes have the potential to raise 
jurisdictional concerns, it is likely that the prominence of jurisdictional 
issues may detract from the development of substantive legal rules.  An 
associated challenge in recognizing the bounds of cyberlaw is to identify 
appropriate behavioral norms online, and to appreciate the extent to which 
online norms differ from norms of the physical world.  Where individual 
actors are confronted with a computer screen rather than a physical person, 
                                                                                                                            
35
   Google is probably the world’s leading search engine.  See www.google.com, last 
viewed on August 1, 2011. 
36
  Second Life, Definition of Avatar (“In a virtual world, an avatar is a digital persona 
that you can create and customize.”, see http://secondlife.com/whatis/avatar/?lang=en-US, 
last viewed on August 1, 2011.  Urban Dictionary defines “avatar” as: “An icon which 
represents a user in a virtual reality/Internet setting, currently attempted with varying 
success. The term is adopted from Neal Stephenson.”  See 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=avatar, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
37
  Wikipedia, Second Life (“Second Life is an online virtual world developed by 
Linden Lab which was launched on June 23, 2003.”), see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Life, last viewed on August 1, 2011. 
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those actors are bound to behave differently – and may be expected to 
behave differently – than they would in a physical interaction.38  The 
distinctive qualities of cyberlaw that have been identified in this Part are 
fleshed out in Parts II to V.  The initial focus in Part II is on the key role of 
Internet intermediaries to the development of a meaningful cyberlaw field.   
 
II.  INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES:  THE LAW OF THE MIDDLEMEN  
 
A.  With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility 
 
Internet intermediaries are the backbone of Internet interactions.  
Without intermediaries, no one could go online or do much of anything by 
way of online activity.  Intermediaries thus play a powerful and important 
role.  Where one intermediary holds a dominant position in a relevant niche 
– such as Google for online searching or Facebook for social networking – 
the power of that intermediary may warrant significant concern and 
scrutiny.39 
 
Defining the role of Internet intermediaries in terms of their legal 
responsibilities towards others must be a central focus of cyberlaw.  The 
power of intermediaries is not restricted to their ability to control access to 
their services through passwords and other encryption technologies.  
Intermediaries are also able to control the user experience by controlling the 
underlying software code.40  An avatar in Second Life can only be – and do 
- what the software will support.  Initially, Second Life did not provide skin 
                                                 
38
  Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky and Thomas Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous 
Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L REV 1537, 1575 (2007) (“Studies show that even when an 
Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his e-mail message, the speaker 
is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged in ‘computer mediated communication’ 
than in other types of communications.  The technology separates the speaker from the 
immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) lulling her to believe that there 
will be no consequences.  Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous speakers, 
it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.”); ROBIN BARNES, 
OUTRAGEOUS INVASIONS:  CELEBRITIES’ PRIVATE LIVES, MEDIA, AND THE LAW, 35 (2010) 
(“Mass electronic communication eliminates the self-censorship that normally occurs when 
dealing with an individual or communicating face-to-face.”) 
39
  See, for example, JANET LOWE, GOOGLE SPEAKS:  SECRETS OF THE WORLD’S 
GREATEST BILLIONAIRE ENTREPRENEURS, SERGEY BRIN AND LARRY PAGE, 10 (2009) 
(noting that as Google gained market share and power, it also gained negative publicity for 
becoming too powerful); Facebook has attracted much criticism for its lack of privacy 
protections for users.  See, for example, Rory Cellan-Jones, Facebook Faces Criticism on 
Privacy Change, BBC News, Dec 10, 2009 (available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8405334.stm, last viewed on August 1, 2011). 
40
  See supra note 22. 
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colors for avatars outside the Caucasian range.  The game now supports the 
creation of alternative tones – or “skins”41 - for participants who want their 
avatars to appear as African American, Native American, or Asian, for 
example.  But presumably if Linden Laboratories, the creators of Second 
Life, objected to the creation of different skin colors, they could disable 
features of the software that allow users to create such skins. 
 
This Part considers the role of Internet intermediaries, and outlines some 
of the key issues about intermediary liability and responsibility that should 
be central to cyberlaw.  It considers the extent to which intermediaries are 
appropriately held liable for direct infringements of legal rights in areas 
such as defamation, privacy, copyright, and trademark law.  It also 
examines the challenging questions of where to set the boundaries for 
secondary liability of intermediaries with respect to wrongs committed by 
others.  Finally, it examines other obligations that may be owed by 
intermediaries to victims of online wrongs, such as the obligation to identify 
primary wrongdoers for the purposes of legal proceedings. 
 
B.  Direct Versus Indirect Liability for Online Wrongs 
 
The power and prominence of intermediaries underscore the importance 
of appropriately regulating these entities.  By the same token, it is important 
that intermediaries, particularly those providing novel services, are not 
over-regulated to the point that online innovation is chilled.  Lawmakers are 
faced with difficult questions involving the regulation of powerful, and 
often extremely innovative, intermediaries.  These questions include 
determining when an intermediary should be held liable for harmful online 
conduct either as a direct participant (primary infringer) or as a facilitator 
(secondary infringer).   
 
While questions of intermediary liability comprise many pages in most 
cyberlaw casebooks, these pages tend to be scattered throughout different 
chapters.  Questions about intermediary liability for copyright infringement 
will be discussed in a chapter about copyright law, while intermediary 
liability for defamation and privacy will typically be discussed in a free 
speech, privacy, or general tort chapter.  While one aim of this article is to 
support a cyberlaw field, another important goal is to re-organize the field 
to better reflect legal developments over the last decade or so.  It may make 
sense in the future for discussions of intermediary liability to be considered 
together across all relevant fields of law – copyright, trademark, 
                                                 
41
  See http://secondlife.com/destinations/fashion/skins, last viewed on August 1, 2011 
(demonstrating ways to customize skin and body shapes in Second Life). 
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defamation, privacy, bullying, harassment etc.  This would allow synergies 
between existing fields to be identified.  It would further facilitate the 
development of more meaningful, harmonized, and predictable legal rules. 
 
It is increasingly difficult to ascertain whether an intermediary should 
be held primarily, or rather secondarily, liable for many online wrongs.  
Where a wrong is committed in the physical world – such as theft, 
conversion, negligence, or battery – the identity of the primary wrongdoer is 
usually readily apparent, and it is usually not an intermediary.  Even if a 
third party intermediary facilitates the wrong, the actual wrongdoer is 
typically easy to distinguish from that third party.  If I steal from you and 
deposit the proceeds of the theft into my bank account, the bank may be 
secondarily liable for some aspects of my conduct42 and may be subject to a 
garnishment order in relation to the stolen funds.43  However, it is clear that 
the bank – the intermediary or middleman – is not the primary wrongdoer.  
The bank might be at most complicit in my primary wrongdoing depending 
on its level of knowledge of, or participation in, my wrongful conduct.   
 
Online, however, it is often difficult to discern who is most 
appropriately described as the primary wrongdoer.  In a recent trademark 
case involving keyword advertising, for example, it was not clear whether 
the Netscape search engine should be regarded as a primary or rather a 
secondary infringer.44  Netscape’s advertising system allowed its paying 
advertisers to link their advertisements to terms pre-identified by Netscape 
as common search terms in the advertiser’s field.  Thus, a dog food 
company might pay to have its advertisements keyed to search results when 
an Internet user enters a search query related to dogs.45   
 
The plaintiff in this case – Playboy Enterprises – complained that 
Netscape had included its trademarked terms “playboy” and “playmate” for 
                                                 
42
  William Blair, Secondary Liability of Financial Institutions for the Fraud of Third 
Parties, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 74 (2000) (noting the basis upon which secondary liability is 
often imposed on banks and financial institutions in British-based common law systems). 
43
  Allen Myers, Untangling the Safety Net: Protecting Federal Benefits from Freezes, 
Fees, and Garnishment, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV. 371, 375-380 (2009) (explaining the basis 
and nature of a typical garnishment order filed against a bank). 
44
  Playboy Enterprises v Netscape, 354 F. 3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
45
  Id. at 1022-1023 (“Keying allows advertisers to target individuals with certain 
interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms.  To take an innocuous example, 
a person who searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely customer for a 
company selling seeds.  Thus, a seed company may pay to have its advertisement displayed 
when searchers enter terms related to gardening.”) 
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keying advertisements related to sex and adult entertainment.46  It was not 
clear on the face of some of the resulting advertisements whether they were 
officially related to the plaintiff’s business.47  Thus, the Internet user 
clicking on the ad could potentially be confused as to whether it was dealing 
with Playboy or an unaffiliated entity providing similar services.  A 
successful infringement action requires consumers of a product or service to 
be confused about the source of that product or service.48  Playboy thus 
claimed infringement with respect to the confusing advertisements keyed to 
the terms “playboy” and “playmate”. 
 
While ultimately holding Netscape liable for infringement, the court 
was unsure about whether Netscape was a direct infringer or a secondary 
infringer.49  In many ways, secondary liability for Internet intermediaries 
makes the most sense.  Intermediaries, by definition, are third parties who 
facilitate activities between principal actors.  If one of the principals 
commits a wrong, then it would be logical to suppose that the intermediary 
would generally be at most secondarily liable.  
 
However, online the lines are blurred largely because the intermediaries 
control the software code.  If Netscape codes its keyword advertising 
software in a certain way and advertisers choose from keywords pre-
selected by Netscape, should Netscape face primary liability because of its 
control over the functionality of the system?   The Netscape court did not 
resolve the issue of primary versus secondary liability, holding that 
Netscape was liable for infringement on one basis or the other and that there 
was no need to determine which.50  One could easily argue either way.  It is 
easy to suggest that the advertisers competing with the plaintiff were 
primarily liable for infringements because they were the ones who drafted 
the confusing ads that were then keyed to the plaintiff’s trademarks.  
Alternatively, one could argue that Netscape should be primarily liable 
                                                 
46
  Id., at 1022-1023 (describing the nature of the plaintiff’s claim). 
47
  Id., at 1023 (“[Plaintiff] introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads 
displayed on defendants’ search results pages are often graphic in nature and are 
confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.”) 
48
 Id., at 1024 (“The ‘core element of trademark infringement,’ the likelihood of 
confusion, lies at the center of this case.”). 
49
  Id. (“the parties dispute whether a direct or a contributory theory of liability applies 
to defendants’ actions.  We conclude that defendants are potentially liable under one theory 
and that we need not decide which one.”) 
50
  Id. (“Whether the defendants are directly or merely contributorily liable proves to 
be a tricky question. However, we need not decide that question here. We conclude that 
defendants are either directly or contributorily liable. Under either theory, [plaintiff’s] case 
may proceed. Thus, we need not decide this issue.”) 
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because of its choice of the keywords it coded into the system.   
 
While the basis of Netscape’s liability did not have much practical 
impact in this decision, there will be cases in which determination of the 
nature of an intermediary’s liability will have a significant impact on the 
outcome.  In the more recent Cartoon Network case involving copyright 
infringement claims the court considered whether the provider of a digital 
video recorder (DVR) was primarily or secondarily liable for content copied 
to its servers at the request of its customers.51  This issue simply could not 
have arisen in the pre-digital world of video recording.  In the days of 
Betamax and VHS recorders, it was clear that any primary infringements – 
unauthorized copies – were made by owners of video recorders.  The 
providers of the copying technology were not involved in the primary 
infringements.  They did not decide which programs were recorded, when, 
or how often.  They did not even know what programs were being recorded 
by their customers.  They merely provided the technology that enabled the 
copying.  The Supreme Court in 1984 considered whether Sony as the 
manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder might be held liable for 
infringements of copyrighted works carried out by its customers.  However, 
it could only potentially have been secondarily liable as Sony itself did not 
conduct any copying.52 
 
New digital technology enables the copying process to occur remotely 
over a network.  The DVR service in Cartoon Network mimicked the 
functionality of an old-fashioned analog video recorder, but in practice 
worked quite differently.  As with a set-top video recorder, the DVR service 
provided by the defendant – Cablevision – to its customers allowed 
customers to record programs from the television.  However, unlike analog 
recorders, Cablevision’s service enabled copies to be made remotely and 
stored on Cablevision’s servers.53  Thus, Cablevision itself physically made 
the infringing copies of protected television programs, but at its customers’ 
request.54   
 
The Cartoon Network court held that Cablevision was not a direct 
infringer of the defendants’ copyrights.55  According to the court, if there 
                                                 
51
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121 (2008). 
52
  Sony v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that manufacturers of 
Betamax video recorders were not liable for copying conducted by their customers as the 
customers were making fair uses of the copyrighted material). 
53
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 124-125 (2008) (describing the 
operation of Cablevision’s remote DVR system). 
54
  Id 
55
  Id., at 133 (“We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the 
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was any infringement, it was the users of the service who effectively made 
the copies by ordering Cablevision’s servers to record them.56  These users 
were unlikely to be held liable as direct infringers because of the Sony 
decision.  In Sony, the Supreme Court had held that television audiences did 
not infringe copyrights when they recorded programs for later viewing.57  
This practice was labeled “time shifting” and was considered by a majority 
of the Court to be a fair use of the copyrighted work.58  Assuming that 
Cablevision’s customers were largely engaged in time-shifting, there would 
be no primary infringement for which Cablevision could be secondarily 
liable.59   
 
While this reasoning makes sense in practice, the Cartoon Network 
court went to great lengths to avoid holding Cablevision liable as a direct 
infringer.  As Cablevision in fact did make the actual copies of the protected 
works, and as copyright infringement is a strict liability wrong,60 it would 
seem on first impression that Cablevision should have been held primarily 
liable.  It was only by reading a volition requirement into copyright 
infringement that the court was able to avoid this result.61  Following an 
                                                                                                                            
RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision's contribution to 
this reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct 
liability.”) 
56
  Id. 
57
 Sony v Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“One may search the 
Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people 
who watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing 
at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such 
copying possible.”) 
58
  Id., at 454 (“we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's 
conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use”). 
59
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008) (“The question is who 
made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs' theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it 
is the customer, plaintiffs' theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, 
secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.”)  
60
  JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION:  COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU, 13 (2011) 
(“copyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea requirement for liability”). 
61
 Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 131 (2008) (“When there is a 
dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its 
progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made. 
There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision's conduct in 
designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a 
customer's conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the 
case of a VCR, it seems clear-and we know of no case holding otherwise-that the operator 
of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the 
necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct 
from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is 
sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a 
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earlier Internet intermediary precedent,62 the court started chipping away at 
the strict liability basis of copyright infringement in order to reach the 
desired result. 
 
Identifying the nature of an intermediary’s liability for online wrongs 
raises a number of important challenges.  Lawmakers must be aware of the 
need to check the power held by online gatekeepers when wrongs are 
committed, but at the same time avoid over-regulating and thereby chilling 
technological innovation.  The intermediary’s power stems from the nature 
of the Internet as a mode of intermediated information exchange.  
Intermediaries control access to information as well as the code that enables 
users to engage in online activities.   
 
However, that power in itself does not always justify the imposition of 
primary liability.  As in the Cartoon Network case, sometimes a court will 
promote technological innovation by avoiding a finding of primary liability.  
Questions of primary versus secondary liability for intermediaries come up 
again and again in different contexts online.63   This fact suggests a need to 
focus on the legal responsibilities of intermediaries within a cohesive 
cyberlaw field, rather than in disparate areas of the law such as copyright, 
trademark, defamation, and privacy. 
 
                                                                                                                            
different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer's command.”)  
See also discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and the Role of 
Intent in Copyright Infringement, 13 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT & 
TECHNOLOGY LAW 767, 791 (2011) (“The Cartoon Network court employed an approach 
adopted in at least one earlier Internet case involving individual copying that had been 
enabled by an Internet service provider.  The earlier case had imposed a ‘volition’ 
requirement in the context of direct infringement.  In other words, the plaintiff needed to 
prove that the defendant’s conduct was volitional rather than a largely automated 
technological process.  This volition requirement may be seen as a judicial gloss on strict 
liability to accommodate technological innovation.”) [hereinafter, Cyberspace 
Exceptionalism]. 
62
  Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008), citing Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
63
  Playboy Enterprises v Netscape, 354 F. 3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussion of 
primary versus secondary liability of search engine in the trademark infringement context); 
Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings, 536 F. 3d 121, 130 (2008) (discussion of primary versus 
secondary liability of video recording service provider in the copyright infringement 
context); Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommate.com, 521 F. 3d 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008) (discussing whether an online housemate matching service could be held 
primarily liability for content posted by customers that allegedly infringed fair housing 
legislation). 
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C.  Intermediary Secondary Liability 
 
Even within the context of secondary liability, lawmakers face 
challenges about the appropriate scope of intermediary liability for online 
wrongs committed by others.  In the early days of the Internet, legal 
questions about intermediary liability tended to revolve around ISPs that 
provided bulletin boards and other basic communications forums.64  Courts 
were asked whether providers of such forums could be held liable for 
communications posted by their members and, if so, on what basis.65  The 
most common claims in the late 1990s related to defamation and copyright 
infringement.66  
 
In the absence of a unified cyberlaw field, courts considered ISP 
liability purely from the point of view of the field of law from which the 
claim arose: defamation or copyright.  Little thought was given to the 
overarching impact of the principles of intermediary liability on the 
development of online law more generally.  In other words, lawmakers may 
have missed significant critical points in the development of Internet law to 
ensure a systematic consideration of principles of Internet intermediary 
liability and to develop coherent principles to guide intermediaries in their 
future conduct.  The law on ISP liability for defamation and copyright 
evolved, first through common law, and later through legislation, in a 
piecemeal fashion.  Today it is difficult to reconcile the principles of ISP 
liability for defamation with those of ISP liability for copyright 
infringement.   
 
In early defamation cases, for example, courts generally exempted ISPs 
from liability for defamatory comments posted by others provided that the 
ISP had not itself exercised significant editorial control over the content 
                                                 
64
  Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of 
ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont v 
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for 
allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers); Playboy Enterprises v Frena, 839 F. 
Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering liability of bulletin board operator for copyright 
infringements of those posting on the bulletin board); Religious Technology Center v 
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering extent to which ISP and operator 
of bulletin board service could be held liable for copyright infringements of those posting 
information on the bulletin board) 
65
  Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (considering liability of 
ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont v 
Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (considering liability of ISP for 
allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers). 
66
  See supra, note 64. 
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posted.67  This soon proved problematic because it effectively penalized 
ISPs who were attempting to “do the right thing” and censor inappropriate 
conduct.  The more active the ISP was in, say, protecting children from 
harmful material, the more likely it would be to attract legal liability.68  ISPs 
that turned a blind eye to communications they facilitated were more likely 
to escape legal liability than those that were more pro-active about 
monitoring content.69 
 
Congress eventually intervened, enacting § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA).  This section, in relevant part, provides that:  “No 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”70  Courts interpreted this provision as almost a blanket 
immunity for ISPs for any defamatory comments posted by others.71  ISPs 
were exempted from liability even in situations where they were complicit 
in the posting of defamatory or harmful content.  In one case, an ISP was 
exempted from liability even though it had contracted with a columnist to 
contribute provocative content that it knew was likely to be at least 
occasionally defamatory.72  In another case, an ISP was held to be immune 
where it had been made aware of damaging false comments and had failed 
to remove them in a timely fashion.73  To date, ISPs have only been held 
liable as information content providers under § 230 where they have 
                                                 
67
  Cubby v Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ISP not liable for 
defamatory content posted by others); Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (ISP was liable for comments posted by others because it was 
said to have exercised significant control over content through its family friendly 
monitoring practices). 
68
  Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995) (holding 
family friendly ISP liable for allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers because 
of its attempts to monitor content, suggesting it should have controlled content more 
effectively). 
69
  Id., at 13 (“PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, 
has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that 
make no such choice.”) 
70
  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
71
  David Lukmire, Can the Courts Take the Communications Decency Act?  The 
Reverberations of Zeran v America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 372 (2010) 
(“Over the years, state and federal courts have interpreted section 230 expansively, 
conferring a broad immunity upon website operators that host third-party content. The 
statute has grown into a ‘judicial oak,’ with impacts far beyond its language sounding in 
defamation law and its original intent to prevent the nascent Internet from becoming a ‘red 
light district.’”) 
72
  Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
73
  Zeran v America Online, 129 F. 3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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actually written the relevant content themselves,74 rather than having 
contracted with another to write it. 
 
The current position on ISP liability for defamation and other harmful 
speech differs dramatically from the position on ISP liability for copyright 
infringement.  Initially, when Internet users posted copyrighted content on 
bulletin boards, courts struggled to determine whether the ISPs that 
provided the speech forums should be held liable for those infringements.75  
Ultimately, Congress stepped in to ensure that ISPs were not held liable for 
copyright infringement when they were acting as mere conduits or 
repositories for the postings of others.76   
 
Congress enacted the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA) as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998.  OCILLA provides a safe harbor for direct ISP liability in the case 
of non-volitional or non-willful copying: in other words, copying that 
occurs as part of a purely technical or mechanical process and that was 
initiated by another person.77  The statute also exempts ISPs from secondary 
liability where the ISP had no actual or constructive knowledge of the 
infringement, had not directly benefited from the infringement, and had 
responded expeditiously to a request to remove infringing content.78   
 
The ISP safe harbors for defamation and copyright were enacted around 
the same time.79  However, the respective statutes take quite different 
approaches.  This result is not surprising as the drafters of OCILLA were 
focused on amending the copyright act for the digital age, while the drafters 
of the CDA were dealing with a broader statute about protecting children 
from harmful material online.80  Both statutes would have been incredibly 
challenging to draft, particularly in the early days of the Internet when it 
                                                 
74
  Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommate.com, 521 F. 3d 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008) (but note that this was not a defamation case, but rather a case involving 
alleged infringements of fair housing legislation). 
75
  Playboy Enterprises v Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (considering ISP 
liability for copyright infringement); Religious Technology Center v Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering copyright infringement liability of ISP and bulletin 
board operator). 
76
  17 U.S.C. § 512. 
77
  17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
78
 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).  The statute also exempted ISPs from liability for system 
caching ie temporary housing of copies of digital information:  15 U.S.C. § 512(b). 
79
  Section 230 of the CDA was enacted in 1996 while OCILLA was enacted in 1998. 
80
  Lukmire, supra note 71, at 373-378 (describing the legislative history of the 
Communications Decency Act as being an attempt to constitutionally incentivize website 
operators to police the Internet and to prevent minors from accessing harmful content). 
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was unclear how relevant technologies would ultimately develop and how 
people would use them.   
 
Nonetheless, there were significant commonalities between what the 
drafters were trying to do, at least in the case of the ISP safe harbor 
provisions.  Drafters of both statutes were faced with the emerging role of 
the Internet intermediary and questions about the impact of imposing 
liability upon intermediaries for wrongs committed by others.  However, 
each drafting group understandably focused on its own brief with no 
broader focus on the Internet’s development more generally.  This is where 
the acceptance of a cyberlaw field may have been helpful.  It would have 
provided an obvious theoretical framework for discussions of important 
policy issues across disparate disciplines that raise significant 
commonalities online. 
 
In the final analysis, it is possible to reconcile the approaches taken by 
Congress respectively in OCILLA and in § 230 of the CDA, although the 
reconciliation may be somewhat unsatisfying and is basically an ex post 
facto rationalization.   For example, one might argue that it is easier for an 
ISP to have knowledge of a copyright infringement than of the veracity of a 
defamation claim because copyrights are generally registered81 and because 
OCILLA requires the claimant to give detailed notice to the ISP of a 
copyright claim.82  Thus, it is arguably reasonable to hold ISPs liable for 
copyright infringement on the basis of notice but to largely exempt them 
from defamation liability regardless of notice.  It is at least theoretically 
much easier for an ISP to make a reasonable judgment about the veracity of 
a copyright claim than about the bona fides of a defamation claim.   
 
Of course, one could argue that if an ISP is not in a good position to 
make decisions about the merits of a defamation claim, then the ISP should 
err on the side of protecting the claimant’s reputation and should be 
exposed to liability if it fails to act.  However, this opens an ISP up to 
potentially frivolous claims that cannot be easily verified.  If the ISP is 
required to act on each claim by removing offending material – or at least 
investigating the merits - the resulting costs may be prohibitive.  There is no 
easy way for an ISP to determine whether posted comments are defamatory 
or not, as opposed to a copyright claim where registration of a copyright is 
at least prima facie evidence of its validity.83   
                                                 
81
 TEHRANIAN, supra note 60, at 98 (noting the necessity of registering copyrighted 
works in the United States in order to obtain meaningful judicial relief for infringement). 
82
  17 U.S.C. §(c)(3)(A). 
83
  MARHSALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 273(5 ed, 2010) (noting 
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At the end of the day, the ISP is put in the unenviable position of either 
erring on the side of facilitating the free flow of ideas online or of 
monitoring and policing content.  Where the content involves rights that can 
be verified by the ISP, the ISP might legitimately be required to act to 
protect those interests.  However, where the content involves pure speech 
which may damage a person’s reputation, but which may or may not be 
defamatory, the ISP is not in as good a position to make a determination 
about the merits.  Thus, Congress and the courts effectively made the 
decision to exempt the ISP from most liability in the defamation area, and 
to promote free speech and technological innovation.  This result puts 
aggrieved parties in the position of having to sue the primary infringer - the 
person who actually wrote the allegedly defamatory content. 
 
One might criticize the different approaches taken between OCILLA 
and § 230 of the CDA.  In fact, it is interesting that there is so little 
commentary on the comparison in current literature.  In both defamation 
and copyright claims, ISPs have been put into the position of making 
difficult decisions about whether or not to act in the face of a complaint.  In 
both cases they have had to examine the extent to which they might be 
regarded as complicit in the alleged wrong.  And in both cases they have 
been put in the position of making decisions that impact on free expression: 
that is, to remove content and risk being criticized for censorship or to allow 
allegedly infringing content and risk being sued as complicit in the 
commission of an online wrong.  However, Congress acted in a way that 
misses these synergies, taking one approach with respect to copyrights and 
another with respect to defamation and other harmful content.   
 
 A renewed focus on cyberlaw as a legitimate field would create a 
policy-oriented space for debates about commonalities between apparently 
disparate areas of law like defamation and copyright, as applied online.  
This would be a useful development particularly in the area of intermediary 
liability for content created or posted by others.  There is an urgent need for 
a theoretical framework within which to engage in discussions of 
intermediary liability.  New issues of intermediary liability are constantly 
arising, often requiring novel applications of legal principles.84   
                                                                                                                            
that registration of a copyright “confers prima facie evidence of the validity of the 
copyright”). 
84
  LOWE, supra note 39, at 213 (“From patent, copyright, and trademark infringement 
to click fraud to wrongful dismissal, Google spends a lot of time in court.  While it is true 
that Google makes a large target, it also is true … that it is operating in a field littered with 
uncertainties begging to be resolved in the courts of law.  Some of the lawsuits address key 
22 CYBERLAW 2.0 [9-Aug-11 
 
For example, in two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit considered the 
extent to which two different online service providers – the Google search 
engine in one case, and the Visa online payments system in the other – 
could be liable for copyright infringement.85  The plaintiff in both cases was 
Perfect 10, a company that made its money from selling photos of nude 
models online.86  In the litigation against Google, Perfect 10 claimed 
copyright infringement in respect of unauthorized reproductions and 
displays of its copyrighted photographs that showed up in search results.87  
Perfect 10 claimed both direct and indirect infringement, arguing that 
Google should be held responsible for its own reproductions and displays of 
the copyrighted photographs in its search engine results.88  It should also be 
held secondarily liable for the infringements of the people who had actually 
made the illegal copies in the first place where the copies showed up in 
search results.89  In the litigation against Visa, Perfect 10 claimed only 
secondary copyright infringement with respect to Visa enabling payments to 
companies that sold unauthorized reproductions of Perfect 10’s protected 
photographs.90 
 
With respect to the secondary liability claims, the court ultimately held 
                                                                                                                            
issues that could define both Google and the Internet of the future.”) 
85
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 
788 (9th Cir. 2007). 
86
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10 markets and 
sells copyrighted images of nude models. Among other enterprises, it operates a 
subscription website on the Internet. Subscribers pay a monthly fee to view Perfect 10 
images in a ‘members' area’ of the site.”) 
87
  Id., at 1159 (“Perfect 10 claims that Google’s search engine program directly 
infringes two exclusive rights granted to copyright holders: its display rights and its 
distribution rights”). 
88
  Id., at 1163 (noting that plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case 
that Google had infringed its copyrights by reproducing copyrighted photographs as 
thumbnail images); but see 1168 (court ultimately held that Google’s reproductions of the 
images as thumbnails in its search engine results page was a fair use and therefore non-
inringing). 
89
  Id., at 1170 (describing the need to evaluate: “Perfect 10's arguments that Google is 
secondarily liable in light of the direct infringement that is undisputed by the parties: third-
party websites' reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 
10's images on the Internet”). 
90
  Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Perfect 10, Inc. (Perfect 10) 
sued Visa International Service Association, MasterCard International Inc., and several 
affiliated banks and data processing services (collectively, the Defendants), alleging 
secondary liability under federal copyright … law …. It sued because Defendants continue 
to process credit card payments to websites that infringe Perfect 10's intellectual property 
rights after being notified by Perfect 10 of infringement by those websites.”) 
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that Google could potentially be contributorily liable for the copyright 
infringements, but that there were factual matters to be reconsidered on 
remand.91  However, with respect to Visa, the court held no secondary 
liability on the basis that Visa’s activities were too far removed from the 
primary infringements to be regarded as contributing to those 
infringements.92   In distinguishing the Google case, the court noted in Visa 
that: “The salient distinction is that Google’s search engine itself assists in 
the distribution of infringing content to Internet users, while [Visa’s] 
payments systems do not.”93  The majority in Visa admitted that Visa assists 
in making the primary infringements profitable, but they distinguished the 
profitability of the infringement from the distribution and availability of 
infringing images online.94   
 
The Visa case included a strong dissent from Judge Kozinski who 
argued that the payments system provides more than a mere economic 
incentive to infringe, but actually provides “an essential step in the 
infringement process”.95  In Judge Kozinski’s view, without the payments 
systems, infringement would be almost impossible.96  Clearly, there is room 
                                                 
91
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1172-1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Google could be 
held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were 
available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to 
Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.  The district court did not 
resolve the factual disputes over the adequacy of Perfect 10’s notices to Google and 
Google’s responses to those notices.  Moreover, there are factual disputes over whether 
there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from providing access to 
infringing images.  Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district court for further 
consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that Google was 
contributorily liable …”) 
92
  Perfect 10 v Visa, 494 F. 3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The credit card companies 
cannot be said to materially contribute to the infringement in this case because they have 
no direct connection to that infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction, 
alteration, display and distribution of Perfect 10's images over the Internet. Perfect 10 has 
not alleged that any infringing material passes over Defendants' payment networks or 
through their payment processing systems, or that Defendants' systems are used to alter or 
display the infringing images. … While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it 
easier for websites to profit from this infringing activity, the issue here is reproduction, 
alteration, display and distribution, which can occur without payment.”)  
93
  Id., at 797. 
94
 Id. (“[Visa] do[es], as alleged, make infringement more profitable, and people are 
generally more inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable.  However, 
there is an additional step in the causal chain:  Google may materially contribute to 
infringement by making it fast and easy for third parties to locate and distribute infringing 
material, whereas [Visa] make[s] it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to 
increase financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement.”) 
95
  Id., at 812.  
96
  Id.(“My colleagues recognize, as they must, that helping consumers locate 
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for disagreement as to where to draw the secondary liability line when it 
comes to Internet gatekeepers.  While both the cases involving Perfect 10 
were about copyright law, and did not impact other areas of law, the 
position of search engines and other online intermediaries is an unenviable 
one in many contexts.   
 
While providing accessible and innovative services to enable 
individuals to interact more efficiently and effectively online, these service 
providers are subject to the possibility of secondary liability claims for 
activities about which they have little actual knowledge:  including 
copyright, defamation, trademark infringement, bullying, harassment 
liability etc.  Courts are likely to be faced with questions about what an 
intermediary could or should have known about the activities of a primary 
infringer in a number of these different contexts.  These questions are 
therefore not unique to copyright law.   
 
As intermediaries’ business operations continue to scale up, they may be 
less and less sure of what all their users are doing.  In remanding the Google 
case back to the lower court, the Ninth Circuit was mindful that it had 
insufficient information about the realities of Google’s position to make a 
meaningful determination on contributory liability.  All it held was that 
liability was possible on this basis, but it wanted the lower court to look 
more closely at the position Google was actually in, and whether Google 
realistically had the capabilities to detect and prevent copyright 
infringement.97 
 
Courts will continue to face questions of the secondary liability of 
online intermediaries in copyright and other areas of law.  A broader 
cyberlaw-based perspective on these questions may ultimately be useful in 
creating laws that give more meaningful and predictable guidance to those 
providing online gateway services.  Cyberlaw is the field in which this can 
be achieved.  In recent years, scholars have made some headway in 
                                                                                                                            
infringing content can constitute contributory infringement, but they consign the means of 
payment to secondary status…. But why is locating infringing images more central to 
infringement than paying for them?  If infringing images can’t be found, there can be no 
infringement; but if infringing images can’t be paid for, there can be no infringement 
either…”) 
97
  Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 1172-1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (“there are factual 
disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from 
providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district 
court for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that 
Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to full-size infringing images under the 
test enunciated today.”) 
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examining relevant legal principles not from the point of view of specific 
legal field, but from the point of view of a particular Internet intermediary’s 
perspective.  This has occurred most prominently with respect to search 
engines. 98   Accepting a broader field of cyberlaw might prevent these 
debates from becoming piecemeal and degenerating into digital laws of the 
horse such as “the law of the search engine”, “the law of the online social 
network,” or “the law of virtual worlds”.   
 
D.  Responsibilities to Unmask Online Wrongdoers 
 
Internet intermediaries are often in the position of being the only entity 
capable of identifying or locating an online wrongdoer even in 
circumstances where the intermediary itself is not complicit in committing 
the harm.  Much online communication is anonymous or pseudonymous.99  
Thus, victims of online wrongs cannot identify the person or persons 
engaging in harmful communications.  Again, the power inherent in 
knowing people’s true identities must come with responsibilities not to let 
those people abuse their anonymity.   
 
However, again, the law must strike a delicate balance between ensuring 
that intermediaries assist in unmasking wrongdoers while at the same time 
avoiding a chilling effect on intermediaries’ business models.  If 
intermediaries are too often and too easily required to identify customers 
who wish to remain anonymous, this will likely result in a chilling of online 
activity.  Internet users may be loathe to communicate online for fear of 
being unmasked.100  Intermediaries may also falter if they cannot protect 
their customers’ privacy.101  The requirement that intermediaries stand 
                                                 
98
  Viva Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
475 (2009); Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOKLYN L REV 1327 (2008); Oren 
Bracha and Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, Fairness and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L REV 1129 (2008); James Grimmelman, 
The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L REV 1 (2007); Urs Gasser, Regulating 
Search Engines:  Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J L & TECH 201 (2006); Eric 
Goldman, Search Engine Bias and The Rise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J L& 
TECH 188 (2006). 
99
  Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, ___ BERKELEY TECH. L.J. ___ 
(forthcoming, 2011) (“The anonymity provided by the Internet may increase the volume of 
abusive conduct because it may encourage individuals who would not engage in such 
conduct offline to do so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet.”) 
100
  Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:  Challenges to 
the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1639, 1641 (1995) (noting the trend 
for Internet users to desire to speak without censorship and to take advantage of the 
Internet’s relative anonymity in doing so) 
101
  Id., at 1671 (“The Networld has an abundance of opportunities for full and 
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ready to unmask their customers also imposes costs on intermediaries 
related to obtaining and maintaining sufficiently detailed records to identify 
customers when necessary.   
 
To date, courts have developed rules to determine the circumstances 
under which an Internet intermediary may be ordered to divulge the identity 
of an alleged defendant102 or a witness to an online wrong.103  In these 
cases, judges have had to draw lines that most appropriately balance the 
interests of an intermediary in protecting its members’ anonymity against 
the interests of a complainant.  Judges have faced these challenges in the 
context of cases involving copyright infringement,104 defamation,105 
trademark infringement,106 and complaints about reputational harm.107     
 
A broader look at these questions through the lens of Internet 
intermediary liability more generally would enable more cohesive and 
systematic rules to develop over time.  The development of clearer rules 
about the responsibility of intermediaries to maintain and divulge 
identifying records about customers would assist in making business more 
predictable for intermediaries and their customers.  This predictability may 
also be useful to victims of online wrongs as they would gain a better ex 
ante sense of the likelihood of unmasking a potential defendant or witness 
in a given situation. 
 
The role of the Internet intermediary is a foundational part of the 
cyberlaw field.  Intermediaries are necessary for all online transactions.  No 
one can interact online without using at least one intermediary.  
                                                                                                                            
uninhibited speech. The difficulty has become one of offended parties seeking to inhibit the 
speech of the offending posters of messages. As the offended turn to their lawyers to 
redress their grievances, this uninhibited cauldron of opinion becomes threatened. Should 
strict liability for all electronic transmission become the accepted norm, service providers 
might scramble to hide behind contracts, waivers, monitoring of all content, and censorship 
of messages before posting …. Liability insurance would be prohibitively expensive, the 
burden of monitoring all messages before posting them too demanding, and the possibility 
of facing protracted litigation too onerous.”) 
102
 Columbia Ins. Co. v SeesCandy.Com, 18 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000); Doe I and Doe II v 
Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action No. 3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008 
WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008). 
103
  Doe v 2TheMart.Com., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001). 
104
  In re Verizon Internet Services., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003). 
105
 In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26 (2000). 
106
 Columbia Ins. Co. v SeesCandy.Com, 18 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
107
 Doe I and Doe II v Individuals, Whose True Names Are Unknown, Civil Action No. 
3:07 CV 909 (CFD), 2008 WL 2428206 (D. Conn. June 13, 2008). 
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Intermediaries are the gatekeepers to all we do online.  They hold great 
power in the sense of enabling access to online communications, setting the 
parameters of online conduct through their software coding, and 
maintaining records of the identities of online actors.  Along with this 
power come certain responsibilities.  However, imposing legal 
responsibilities on intermediaries will generally come at a cost.  The more 
duties legally imposed on intermediaries, the more likely the result will be a 
chilling of online innovation.   
 
It is within the cyberlaw field that commentators and lawmakers will 
need to develop appropriate balances to impose obligations on 
intermediaries to an extent that will curtail online harm while preserving the 
vitality of online interaction.  In order to develop this balance, it will be 
necessary to identify the scope of appropriate online behaviors more 
generally.  Thus, another important aspect of the cyberlaw field must be an 
identification and explication of appropriate online norms of behavior. 
 
III.  CYBERNORMS  
 
Cyberspace norms, their identification, and enforcement, often raise 
significantly different interests and dynamics than real space norms of 
behavior.  Real space norms involve physical interactions between people 
and property while cyberspace norms involve communications over often 
great distances.  In real space, people are confronted with other physical 
beings.  Physical world interactions involve facial expressions, tone of 
voice, and physical appearance.  It is often much more difficult to say to 
someone’s face something that you would say behind her back, or that you 
would say anonymously or pseudonymously online.108 
 
Real space laws have developed to reinforce – and simply to enforce – 
real space norms.  Norms about protecting a zone of safety around a person, 
for example, are enforced through stalking and harassment laws.109  The 
problem for cyberlaw is that many of the real world laws that protect 
individuals from harm do not apply meaningfully in cyberspace.  The real 
space laws largely hinge on notions of physical space, personal safety and 
damage to people and property which do not always translate well to 
cyberspace.110   
                                                 
108
  See supra note 38.   
109
  Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ (citing examples of 
these laws). 
110
  Sánchez Abril, supra note 8, at 4 (“In the absence of clear and relevant guidance, 
courts have resorted to intellectual shortcuts in their use of concepts of space, subject 
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The tort of conversion, for example, is fairly well circumscribed in 
physical space.111  It is obvious in spatial terms whether or not someone has 
interfered with another person’s physical property.  But how might that play 
out in cyberspace?  Can you meaningfully “convert” or “steal” another 
person’s virtual or digital property?  Most online property can exist in 
multiple places at the same time so taking (or copying) my digital property 
does not deprive me of my own access to it.  This differs from the physical 
world where property is rivalrous:  that is, it can only exist in one place at a 
time.112  Thus, your taking of my property deprives me of the property.  
However, copying someone’s digital widget creates a second widget and 
does not deprive the owner of the original widget or its use.113  The taking 
may impact the value of the original widget, but not its very existence in the 
hands of the original owner.  Few online assets are truly rivalrous in the 
same sense that physical property is rivalrous.   
 
Even rivalrous online property can raise different legal issues from 
those arising in physical space.  One example of rivalrous digital property is 
an Internet domain name.114  A domain name can only be registered to one 
                                                                                                                            
matter, secrecy, and seclusion as necessary benchmarks for privacy protection.  What were 
once mere indicators of privacy have become, in some instances, the extent of judicial 
inquiry. Problematically, these entrenched constructs are all related in one form or another 
to a pervasive consciousness of physical space, a concept that is no longer relevant in 
analyzing many modern online privacy harms.”)  
111
  Restatement 2d on Torts, § 222A(1) (“Conversion is an intentional exercise of 
dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to 
control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the 
chattel.”) 
112
 Lawrence Solum, Questioning Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 822 
(“’Rivalrousness’ is a property of the consumption of a good. Consumption of a good is 
rivalrous if consumption by one individual X diminished the opportunity of other 
individuals, Y, Z, etc., to consume the good. Some goods are rivalrous because they are 
‘used up.’ If I drink a glass of Heitz Martha's Vineyard, then you cannot drink that same 
glass of wine. If I set off a firecracker, you cannot set off the same firecracker. Other goods 
are rivalrous because of crowding effects. If I am using the free Internet terminal at the 
student lounge, then you cannot use the same time slice of the terminal - because only one 
person can sit in front of the screen at the same time.”) 
113
 The only effective way to actually deprive someone of her digital property is to 
destroy that property: for example, by deleting data from a protected server.  The law has 
traditionally dealt with this kind of conduct by focusing on the hardware aspects of a 
digital system, rather than the content per se.  See, for example, the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act: 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (dealing with hacking into computer systems and destroying 
data). 
114
  JACQUELINE LIPTON, INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES, TRADEMARKS AND FREE SPEECH, 
4 (2010) (“Domain names comprise a unique form of online asset.  They are the closest 
Internet analogy to real property.  This is because, unlike other forms of digital property, 
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person at a time.115  Even so, it is not clear that real world notions of 
property interference apply meaningfully to domain names.  While at least 
one court has held that a domain name is property capable of conversion,116 
the way in which the domain name was wrongfully appropriated was very 
different to an unauthorized taking of physical property.  To convert a 
domain name, one must send a fraudulent request to the domain name 
registering authority to transfer the name.117  It is not possible to simply 
“take” the name as one might take a car, a chair, or an apple.   One must 
rely on an intermediary – in this case, a domain name registry – to effect the 
conversion.  This again underlines the importance of intermediaries in the 
cyberworld. 
 
Of course, real world laws have been developed to deal with 
information-based wrongs as well as physical wrongs.  In other words, we 
already have laws that do not require physical property to exist for a wrong 
to have been committed.  Defamation and privacy laws, for example, deal 
with harms caused by dissemination of damaging information about an 
individual.  These torts, and their associated underlying behavioral norms, 
may be easier to apply online than property-based torts because they do not 
require physical harm to a person or property.  Nevertheless, even these 
informational torts raise new challenges online.   
 
Consider defamation law, for example.  While defamation law in the 
physical world has typically dealt with professional media outlets 
publishing harmful information about individuals, online defamation can be 
quite different.  As more individuals are publishing their own thoughts 
online, and defaming others in the process, the professional journalist is 
effectively replaced – or at least joined in the role of social commentator - 
by the amateur commentator.118  With Web 2.0 technologies,119 individuals 
                                                                                                                            
they are rivalrous.  This means that one domain name can only be held by one person or 
entity at a time.”) 
115
 Id. 
116
  Kremen v Cohen, 337 F. 3d 1024 (2003). 
117
  Jacqueline Lipton, Bad Faith in Cyberspace:  Grounding Domain Name Theory in 
Trademark, Property and Restitution, 23 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
447, 474 (2010) (“a transfer of a domain name is, in reality, a de-registration from the 
original registrant and re-registration to the new registrant, it is now treated routinely as a 
seamless transfer, as if the name was being handed directly from the original registrant to 
the new registrant.”) 
118
  ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR:  HOW BLOGS, MYSPACE, YOUTUBE, 
AND THE REST OF TODAY’S USER-GENERATED MEDIA ARE DESTROYING OUR ECONOMY, 
OUR CULTURE, AND OUR VALUES (2007) (expressing concerns about the move from 
professional media to communal digital media); Larry Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas:  
The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, 48 WM AND MARY L. REV. 185 (2006) 
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easily share their thoughts about others on Twitter, blogs, and online social 
networks. 
 
Naturally, when much of the world’s social commentary is disseminated 
in this way, very different behavioral norms develop than when 
dissemination of information is predominantly in the hands of professional 
media conglomerates.  Individual commentators are not bound by 
professional codes of ethics.120  Individuals may hide behind a shield of 
anonymity more easily than professional journalists.121  Further, individuals 
may simply not be as aware of the laws of defamation and privacy than 
professional media outlets.  This is not to say that individual commentary 
should be prohibited or legally sanctioned more aggressively than 
professional commentary.  Amateur or individual speech provides 
tremendous social benefits.122  However, the norms of Web 2.0 
informational transactions are significantly different from those that 
developed in the physical world.  The existing defamation and privacy laws 
were simply not developed with these kinds of behavioral norms in mind. 
 
Outside of the basic differences between online and offline norms are 
the practical difficulties of applying national defamation laws to online 
conduct because of the jurisdictional reach of particular laws and courts.123  
This is another reason why behavioral norms are increasingly important to 
online transactions.  If norms can be identified and enforced by online 
communities, there is less need for victims of online wrongs to rely on law.  
In other words, laws can serve a signposting function about appropriate 
                                                                                                                            
(examining the rise of amateur journalism through blogging). 
119
  LOWE, supra note 39, at 294 (defining “Web 2.0” as:  “A term used to describe an 
evolving generation of a participatory Web.  Web 2.0 describes the proliferation of 
interconnectivity and social interaction on the World Wide Web.”) 
120
  Ribstein, supra note 118, at 214 (noting that amateur journalists are typically not 
bound by codes of ethics and noting some of the advantages inherent of being free from 
such perceived constraints); KEEN, supra note 118, at 82 (noting lack of codes of ethics in 
amateur online journalism). 
121
   KEEN, supra note 118, at 77 (“In traditional news media, there is no such thing as 
anonymity.  Articles and op-eds run with bylines, holding reporters and contributors 
responsible for the content they create.  This not only holds them to ethical standards, but 
also provides a level of assurance for the public; the writer is accountable for his or her 
reporting or opinions …. But in the anonymous world of the blogosphere there are no such 
assurances, creating a crisis of trust and confidence.”) 
122
  Ribstein, supra note 118, at 214 (“Even if it were feasible to develop norms for 
amateur journalists, it may not be desirable. An important social benefit of amateur 
journalists is that they are not subject to professional norms and constraints. In devising 
extralegal constraints, as with legal regulation, one must control the costs of amateur 
journalism in a way that does not sacrifice its benefits.”) 
123
  See Part IV, infra. 
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behavior124 in contexts where intermediaries and online communities are 
already articulating and enforcing appropriate norms of behavior amongst 
themselves.125 
 
Defamation is not the only area in which online norms may differ from 
the real space counterparts upon which existing laws were originally based.  
Other information-based torts raise challenges when applied online.  
Privacy laws, for example, rely to a significant extent on physical space 
metaphors.  The notion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” which 
arises in both criminal and tort-based privacy law is powerfully tied to 
notions of physical space.126  One might be presumed to have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy behind a locked door but not in a public mall. 
 
However, in cyberspace, it is much more difficult to delineate the 
boundaries of a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly as so much 
digital media blurs the lines between our public and our private selves.127  
Sexting is an obvious example of conduct that may commence as a private 
and consensual act but may quickly escalate into the public domain 
depending on who ultimately gains possession of the images.128  If a 
teenager engages in consensual sexual acts with a partner and agrees to a 
                                                 
124
  NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX, 104-105 (2008) (“[L]aw often serves an 
expressive or symbolic function above and beyond regulating or providing incentives for 
conduct.  Antidiscrimination law, for example, may have symbolic importance beyond 
whatever discriminatory conduct it actually proscribes.  In enacting and applying such law, 
Congress and the courts effectively express our society’s official condemnation of 
discrimination based on race and various other classifications.”) 
125
 From the early days of the Internet, online communities have self-policed and 
enforced acceptable norms of behavior amongst themselves.  See, for example, SHERRY 
TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN:  IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET, 251 (1995) 
(describing the “toading” of a virtual rapist in an early online environment, toading being 
the erasure of his character for his unacceptable behavior). 
126
  SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 74 (noting the difficulties 
inherent in determining reasonable expectations of privacy as privacy is effectively eroded 
through developing technologies such as data collection and digital cameras). 
127
  BARNES, supra note 38, at 35-36 (noting how moves towards reality television and 
personal blogging blur the lines between public and private selves and make private 
individuals into instant celebrities). 
128
  Elizabeth Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers' 
Exchange of Self-Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 557 (2010) 
(“Although sexting has been described as the modern equivalent of ‘streaking,’ new 
technologies dramatically enhance the consequences of this behavior. Camera-equipped 
phones allow permanent recording of images and instant dissemination to large numbers of 
recipients, transforming fleeting youthful indiscretions into lasting mistakes …. the term 
‘sexting’ refers to the self-production and distribution by cell phone of sexually explicit 
images in the course of consensual, voluntary activity by teenagers”). 
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video or picture memorializing the event, does that mean there should be no 
expectation of privacy from that point forward?   
 
Certainly, one could argue that all modern teens with cellphone-cameras 
know that once an image is captured on the phone, it can be globally 
disseminated over the Internet at the push of a button.  On this basis, it may 
be reasonable to differentiate this conduct from an old-fashioned physical 
photograph of a consensual sexual act.  Even though the physical image 
may be shared with others, it cannot be as easily, quickly, cheaply, and 
globally disseminated at the push of a button.  The hard copy photograph 
also lacks the permanence of an Internet distribution of a digital image.  
Once a hard copy photograph is destroyed, no one can view it anymore.  
However, once a digital image is disseminated online, there is no way to 
permanently eradicate it, even if the original image is deleted from where it 
was initially posted.129   
 
Of course arguing about the importance of online norms runs the risk of 
suggesting that laws are irrelevant in cyberspace.  Additionally, to the 
extent that one argues in favor of norm enforcement within a community, 
one potentially circles back to debates about whether cyberspace can – or 
should - be meaningfully regulated by national governments,130 and whether 
law is the most appropriate form of regulation in cyberspace.131  
Emphasizing the importance of norms online does not necessarily mean that 
laws and national governments are irrelevant.  Rather, it is important to 
consider norms as the basis of legal rules, while acknowledging that norms 
can be enforced outside of the law.   
 
Even the earliest Internet communities developed ways to punish those 
who disregarded behavioral norms.132  Norms of more recent online 
communities are often enforced through private online dispute resolution 
procedures that support express rules of the forum.  Wikipedia and Second 
Life, for example, have each developed express rules of online behavior that 
are enforced by private mechanisms.133  Legal rules based on cybernorms 
can also serve an important expressive function in helping us to identify 
                                                 
129
  Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”:  Developing a Privacy Paradigm for 
Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 977 (2010) (describing the impossibility of removing 
all iterations of a given image from the Internet). 
130
  See supra note 27. 
131
  See Lessig, What the Law of the Horse Might Teach, supra note 17. 
132
  See TURKLE, supra note 125. 
133
  Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at Part III.D.4 (describing 
approaches to industry self-regulation online). 
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appropriate dimensions of online behavior in particular contexts.134    
 
The cyberlaw field provides a necessary framework within which to 
situate debates about the identification of online norms in a variety of fields, 
their divergence from physical world norms, and their relationship to legal 
rules.  It provides commentators and lawmakers with a conceptual space 
within which to consider legal developments that reflect and reinforce 
appropriate norms of online behavior.  Of course, one of the reasons that 
investigating norms is so important in cyberspace is that laws may have 
limited jurisdictional reach online.  It is to those jurisdictional challenges 
that we now turn our attention. 
 
IV.  JURISDICTION  
 
A.  Cyberspace Conflicts:  Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
 
When global communications were easily, quickly, and cheaply enabled 
in the 1990s by the widespread public take-up of the Internet, it seemed 
obvious that the major new legal issues would be jurisdictional.  The 
Internet opened up seemingly endless possibilities for litigating against 
foreign defendants, raising choice of law and choice of forum questions as 
well as foreign enforcement challenges.135  Even if a court in the plaintiff’s 
jurisdiction agreed to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant and an 
order was obtained in favor of the plaintiff, it would not always be clear that 
the order could be enforced in the foreign jurisdiction.  Particularly 
problematic were cases where the defendant held no assets in the plaintiff’s 
jurisdiction that might be attached as part of a judgment order.  The ongoing 
litigation between Yahoo! and La Ligue contre le Racisme et 
l’Antisemitisme in France is a good example highlighting uncertainties 
about how, or indeed if, a court order from the plaintiff’s country might be 
enforced in the defendant’s country.136   
 
In the Yahoo! litigation, a French plaintiff successfully obtained a 
French court order to have Yahoo! enjoined from selling Nazi memorabilia 
in France.137  Subsequently, Yahoo! took up the matter in California and 
attempted to obtain a declaration from the Californian courts that the French 
                                                 
134
 NETANEL, supra note 124. 
135
  See, for example, discussion in Michael Gilden, Jurisdiction and the Internet:  The 
“Real World” Meets Cyberspace, 7 ILSA J INT'L & COMP L 149 (2000). 
136
  Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme v Yahoo!, Superior Court of Paris 
(Nov. 20, 2000). 
137
  Id. 
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order would not be enforced against Yahoo!’s assets in California.138  To 
date, the Californian courts have refrained from giving a definitive answer 
to this question.139  The Californian courts have been split on issues whether 
the case is ripe for a decision, and as to whether the Californian courts can 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the French organization.140  The United 
States Supreme Court has denied certiorari,141 so ultimately any decision 
made will be in a lower court in California.     
 
Jurisdictional questions are not necessarily new to the Internet.  
However, the Internet raises new challenges for conflicts of law by its very 
nature.  For one thing, when addressing jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, 
courts have often complicated their analyses by focusing on the hardware 
aspects of the Internet.  For example, at a loss for guidance on how to 
ascertain whether a defendant could be said to have purposefully availed 
herself of the plaintiff’s forum,142 early courts tended to consider the 
location of physical computer servers.143  This approach led to random and 
unpredictable results because of the nature of the Internet.  The whole point 
of the network is that electrons flow relatively randomly through cables 
(and now wirelessly) to avoid a single point of failure bringing down the 
entire network.144  Thus, premising jurisdictional queries on electron flows 
is unlikely to lead to principled and predictable legal rules.   
                                                 
138
 Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (2006). 
139
  Id., at 1224 (“An eight-judge majority of the en banc panel holds… that the district 
court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LICRA and UEJF 
…. A three-judge plurality of the panel concludes … that the suit is unripe for decision ….. 
When the votes of the three judges who conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with 
the votes of the three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction 
over LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss Yahoo!'s suit.”) 
140
  Id. 
141
  La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme v. Yahoo!., 547 U.S. 1163 (2006) 
(denying cert.). 
142
  Purposeful availment is a prong of a specific personal jurisdiction inquiry and 
focuses on the defendant’s activities within the plaintiff’s forum.  See, for example, 
discussion of the concept in Yahoo! v La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 
F.3d 1199, 1205-1207 (2006).  
143
  See, for example, Bochan v La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999) 
(personal jurisdiction hinged on fortuitous location of servers accessed by defendants). 
144
  Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech:  A First 
Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, n 38 (2000) (“The TCP/IP protocols break 
down information transmitted on to the Internet into packets and reassemble it at its 
destination …. This allows the Internet to operate as a packet-switched network where the 
various data packets may travel different routes to reach the same destination ….. This 
design allows information to be transmitted through the Internet at faster speeds than 
circuit-switched networks, where, once a connection is made, that part of the network is 
dedicated only to that connection.”) 
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One reason for the tendency to focus on the physical aspects of the 
network derived from difficulties inherent in the other obvious option – to 
consider where the defendant actually engaged in the harmful conduct.  
When the defendant’s conduct is effectively an online communication, and 
that communication is accessible globally, the purposeful availment inquiry 
is not very meaningful in practice.  If a defendant posts, say, a defamatory 
comment about a plaintiff on a blog that is accessible globally, is it fair to 
say that the defendant has purposely availed herself of the jurisdiction of the 
entire world?145 
 
Another alternative is to create a blanket rule that the appropriate 
jurisdiction for litigation is the place where the plaintiff suffers harm.  
Several courts have taken this approach in the past,146 and it certainly seems 
logical at least from the plaintiff’s point of view.  One could easily argue 
that plaintiffs in, say, defamation suits should not have to go to foreign 
courts to sue defendants who may be taking advantage of their geographical 
distance, or from more lenient defamation laws in a particular jurisdiction. 
 
However, erring on the side of the plaintiff’s jurisdiction may not be 
particularly fair to the defendant.147 If a defendant is potentially to be held 
liable for any comments made online under the  laws of any jurisdiction in 
which a plaintiff resides or does business, it may be impossible for that 
defendant to protect itself from unexpected foreign litigation.  The fact that 
defendants would face such significant risks of litigation in foreign 
jurisdictions under a rule that favored the plaintiff’s jurisdiction may 
ultimately chill much online speech.  Defamation defendants have argued 
against such a rule in past litigation.148  These concerns come into sharp 
                                                 
145
  Dow Jones v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec. 2002), at para. 54 (noting 
defamation defendant’s concern about being haled into court in any jurisdiction in which 
its online publications were accessed). 
146
  Id., at para. 44 (“ordinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where the 
damage to reputation occurs.  Ordinarily that will be where the material which is alleged to 
be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person 
defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged.”); Robertson, supra note 
9; Calder v Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (granting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant 
with respect to a defamation action that harmed the plaintiff – actress Shirley Jones – in 
California). 
147
 Robertson, supra note 9, at ___ (arguing that in the digital age, personal jurisdiction 
queries should be presumptively resolved in favor of the defendant). 
148
  Gutnick v Dow Jones, VSC 305, para. 56 (Aug. 28, 2001) (aff’d, Dow Jones v 
Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (10 Dec. 2002)) (noting American publishers significant concerns 
at being haled into court in Australia for an article it published allegedly defaming an 
Australian resident). 
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relief in situations where defendants are increasingly amateur journalists 
and social commentators who would not have the wherewithal to defend a 
proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction.149   
 
While there are a number of counter-arguments to concerns about 
unfairness to defendants,150  the point of this discussion is not to identify the 
correct rule on personal jurisdiction in cyberspace.  Rather, it is to 
demonstrate that cyberspace raises distinct legal challenges that merit its 
treatment as a discrete legal field with its own set of unifying principles.  
One of those principles has to be the investigation of what factors 
differentiate cyberspace from physical space in the context of determining 
how to approach jurisdictional challenges. 
 
Unlike physical world publications, information disseminated over the 
Internet can generally be received anywhere in the world, subject only to 
technological limitations such as firewalls and encryption.  Thus the default 
position in Internet publication is effectively opposite to that in the physical 
world.  Online information defaults to being published to everyone globally 
whereas in the physical world, information is only published to those to 
whom the publisher has specifically directed it.  Thus, the risk of being 
haled into court in an unexpected foreign jurisdiction is significantly higher 
for a defendant in an Internet case than in a physical world case. 
 
B.  Jurisdiction Deterring Substantive Rights 
 
The Internet may raise additional challenges related to basic 
jurisdictional questions.  In Internet-based litigation, there is a high risk that 
the initial focus of the litigation will be on jurisdictional issues, rather than 
on the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint.  Because of the greater number 
of jurisdictional issues in cyberlaw as compared with physical world cases, 
a greater proportion of cyberspace law cases might be disposed of at the 
                                                 
149
  Robertson, supra note 9, at ___ (noting that many publishers online are now 
private individuals and it would be unfair to presume their amenability to foreign 
jurisdiction). 
150
 Dow Jones v Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56, para. 53 (10 Dec. 2002) (arguing that 
damages award will only be made in a defamation case where the plaintiff realistically has 
a reputation to harm in the place where publication is received); para. 56 (noting that 
plaintiffs are unlikely to sue in a jurisdiction outside the defendant’s forum unless a 
judgment in that forum would be of real value to the plaintiff and the answer to that 
question may depend on whether, and to what extent, the defendant holds assets in the 
plaintiff’s forum); para 56 (noting that in “all except the most unusual of cases, identifying 
the person about whom material is to be published will readily identify the defamation law 
to which that person may resort”).   
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jurisdictional stage without ever getting to a determination of the parties’ 
substantive rights and obligations.  The cyberlaw field can provide a forum 
within which jurisdictional rules may be streamlined and harmonized.  Such 
a result would then minimize the time and expense necessary on 
jurisdictional questions in particular cases, and would allow judges to focus 
more on exploring and developing the substantive rights and obligations of 
parties in cyberspace disputes. 
 
A recent example of a case in which jurisdictional considerations 
arguably detracted from an investigation of the plaintiff’s substantive rights 
is Chang v Virgin Mobile.151  In this case, Chang brought inter alia a 
privacy claim against Virgin Mobile for unauthorized use of a photograph 
of her in an advertising campaign.152  Chang resided in Texas while the 
advertising campaign took place in Australia.  Virgin Mobile had found the 
picture of Chang online and copied it from a public photo-sharing website.  
Virgin Mobile had only utilized the photograph within Australia on bus 
shelter ad shells.153  It had never used the advertisement in the United 
States, nor had it posted the ad to the Internet.154  Because the defendant had 
never directed any of its conduct towards the state of Texas, the American 
court held that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.155 
 
This decision effectively left Chang without a substantive remedy.  For 
one thing, she was an individual and a teenager without the wherewithal to 
sue the defendants in Australia.  Perhaps more significantly, Australia does 
not have the same privacy torts available to plaintiffs as the United States.  
In the United States, Chang could have claimed misappropriation of her 
personal image under the misappropriation limb of privacy tort law.156  The 
                                                 
151
  2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3051 (2009). 
152
  Id., at 1 (Plaintiffs Susan Chang as next friend of Alison Chang, a minor … sued 
defendant Virgin Mobile Pty Ltd., an Australian-based company, in Texas state court on 
claims for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract, and copyright infringement based 
on Virgin Australia's use of an image of Alison … in its ‘Are You With Us or What’ 
advertising campaign ….). 
153
 Id., at 4 (“The advertisement was placed on bus shelter ad shells in major 
metropolitan areas in Australia.  Virgin Australia never distributed the advertisement 
incorporating Alison’s image in the United States, including Texas, and it never posted the 
photograph on its website or on any other website.”) 
154
  Id. 
155
 Id., at 26 (“Because none of the … contacts on which plaintiffs rely establishes 
sufficient minimum contacts between Virgin Australia and the state of Texas, the court 
cannot constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over Virgin Australia.”) 
156
 Restatement 2d of Torts, § 652C (One who appropriates to his own use or benefit 
the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
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misappropriation tort provides a remedy to a plaintiff where a defendant has 
made an unauthorized commercial use of her name or likeness.157  There is 
no similar tort in Australia, even if Chang had had the wherewithal to 
litigate there. 
 
Given that the issue in the Chang case involved unauthorized use of a 
photograph, one might think that the more obvious cause of action would be 
a copyright claim.  After all, copyright law is much more harmonized 
globally than privacy law.158  Australia protects copyrighted photographs to 
a similar extent as the United States.159  The problem for Chang was that 
she was not the photographer, but rather than image subject.  In most cases, 
the person who takes a photograph is the copyright holder with respect to 
that photograph.160  The image subject is therefore hardly ever the copyright 
holder, unless she has contracted for the assignment of copyright, or the 
photograph is a work for hire.161   
 
There may in fact be nothing wrong with the ultimate holding in Chang.  
If Texas is not the correct forum for litigation, then Chang is out of luck.  
Too readily allowing plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions in Internet 
cases, as noted above, may impose insurmountable burdens on defendants 
and hence on online speech more generally.162  However, Chang is far from 
the only Internet case that has been effectively resolved by a jurisdictional 
inquiry either because the plaintiff could not afford to sue in the defendant’s 
jurisdiction or because the plaintiff did not have an effective claim under the 
defendant’s law.   
                                                                                                                            
privacy.”) 
157
  Id. 
158
 LEAFFER, supra note 83, at 570 (describing the major harmonization efforts relating 
to copyright law at the international level). 
159
 Australian Copyright Council, Photographers & Copyright, INFORMATION 
SHEET G011v14 (January 2006, on file with the author) (“Copyright protects a range of 
materials, including photographs”); LEAFFER, supra note 83, at 116 (noting that copyright 
protection for ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ in the United States includes 
photographs under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5)). 
160
 Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the 
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385 (2004) (tracing the history of 
photographic copyrights in the United States and the basis of the trend towards granting 
photographers copyrights in their work). 
161
 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as: “(1) a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or 
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work … if the parties expressly 
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made 
for hire .….”). 
162
  Robertson, supra note 9. 
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Many Internet cases have historically been effectively resolved at the 
jurisdiction determination stage, or have used the jurisdictional inquiry as a 
testing ground for considering the merits of the case.163  Again this is not a 
new phenomenon.  Several pre-Internet cases were effectively resolved by a 
jurisdictional finding adverse to the plaintiff.164  However, there are two 
reasons why Internet cases may require closer analysis with respect to 
jurisdiction.  For one thing, the proportion of Internet cases raising 
jurisdictional issues is likely to be higher than the proportion of non-Internet 
cases.  Thus, Internet law creates greater risks of jurisdictional inquiries 
detracting from inquiries about developments of substantive rights.  The 
second problem is that the substantive issues raised in Internet cases are 
likely to be significantly different from those raised in non-Internet cases.165  
If Internet case law disproportionately tends towards jurisdictional analysis, 
the development of substantive legal rights and duties online is likely to be 
stunted in practice.     
 
If the cyberlaw field can contribute anything to our understanding of the 
law more generally, it should be able to contribute a more systematic and 
principled approach to the development and application of jurisdictional 
principles in Internet-related cases.  The ability to more quickly, efficiently, 
and predictably resolve jurisdictional problems would allow greater focus 
on developing more meaningful substantive rules for online conduct.  Of 
course, jurisdictional issues both online and offline are often extremely 
difficult to resolve.  Nevertheless, the ability to focus specifically on 
cyberspace-related jurisdictional problems within a more unified theoretical 
framework is likely to assist in more principled and predictable legal 
developments. 
 
V.  HARMS AND REMEDIES  
 
                                                 
163
  Roberton, supra note 9, at [2] (“In effects-test cases, the merits are inextricably 
intertwined with jurisdictional issues and therefore unconsciously influence the courts’ 
decisions on personal jurisdiction.”). 
164
  See, for example, ALS Scan v Digital Service Consultants, 293 F. 3d 707 (4th Cir. 
2002) (holding that maintaining a passive website that can be accessed and used by 
residents in the plaintiff’s forum state is insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant); Cybersell v Cybersell, 130 F. 3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a passive 
website accessible in Arizona was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant); Toys R Us v Step Two, 318 F. 3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
mere existence of an interactive commercial website is insufficient to establish that a 
defendant purposely availed itself of the plaintiff’s forum state). 
165
  See supra Part II; infra Part V. 
40 CYBERLAW 2.0 [9-Aug-11 
A.  Recognizing Online Harms 
 
Unlike the physical world where courts will usually award damages to 
remedy economic harms or physical damage to a person or property, 
cyberspace cases will typically revolve around reputational and emotional 
harms.  This is obvious if one thinks back to the nature of the Internet as a 
global communications medium.  Everything that happens online happens 
through information exchange.  There is no physical contact between people 
online.  Thus, damages will not be physical, but psychological, emotional, 
or reputational.  
 
Cyberlaw as a field needs to encompass an investigation of the kinds of 
online harms caused by damaging communications and, as a corollary, the 
appropriate remedies for those harms.  For example, how does one 
effectively quantify the harm caused by posting an embarrassing picture or 
video of someone online which then goes viral and cannot be removed from 
the Internet once it has been shared globally?  Should the law even 
recognize this as a harm capable of legal redress?  People can be severely 
emotionally scarred by damaging online postings.166  However, if there is 
no physical injury resulting from, say, online bullying, mobbing or 
harassment,167 the victim may have been seriously wronged in a moral 
sense, but with no legal remedy.168 
 
Professors Solove and Bartow have for some years engaged in a heated 
debate about whether privacy, for example, has been given short shrift by 
lawmakers in the digital age because there are “not enough dead bodies”.169  
Solove has advocated a conception of privacy that attracts legal 
sanctions.170  Bartow has suggested that perhaps the reason that legislators 
                                                 
166
  DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:  GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET, 35-48 (2007) (giving multiple examples of people whose reputations and 
livelihoods were seriously injured by online gossip) [hereinafter, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION]. 
167
 Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ 
(describing examples of online bullying, mobbing and harassment). 
168
 SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 123 (“Under our current 
legal system, we have remedies for defamation and invasion of privacy, but … these 
remedies are currently quite limited in their effectiveness, especially the law of privacy.  
The current law is too limited and restricted to serve as a tenable threat in many 
situations.”) 
169
  Ann Bartow, “Nothing to Hide” Indeed:  Of “Debunking” and Willful Distortions, 
Madisonian.Net, May 26, 2011 (available at http://madisonian.net/2011/05/26/of-
debunking-and-willful-distortions/, last viewed on August 3, 2011) (debate between 
Professor Bartow and Professor Solove on a popular intellectual property blog). 
170
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 123-124 (describing a 
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and courts have not been prepared to redress some of the wrongs identified 
by Solove is that the harms he has identified are not yet perceived as 
sufficiently visceral.171   
 
The point for cyberlaw studies is that many of the harms which that 
seemed trivial and hardly worthy of remedial action in the physical world 
may now merit legal redress.  Whereas an embarrassing photograph or 
comment about an individual shared in physical space will likely only have 
a minor and temporary effect on that person, even a relatively innocuous 
photograph that goes viral online may dog the image subject for the rest of 
her life.172  Internet communications require a reconsideration of the nature 
of harm that merits legal redress.  Cyberlaw is the appropriate field within 
which to engage in those debates. 
 
B.  Online Wrongs Resulting in Physical Harm 
 
Of course, in some cases, online communications can result in actual 
physical harm.  Some of this harm can be devastating, as in the case where 
an individual posted an ad on Craigslist that a young woman wanted to be 
sexually attacked and giving her address.173  This resulted in the woman 
being attacked by a person who responded to the ad.174  Some cases of 
online bullying or harassment have also led to suicides of the subjects of the 
harmful online commentary.175 The respective suicides of Megan Meier and 
                                                                                                                            
conception of legal remedies for online privacy invasions and other reputational damage). 
171
  Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 11 PENNUMBRA (2006), 
available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2006/Bartow.pdf, last viewed on 
August 3, 2011 (“To phrase it colloquially, in this author’s view, the Solove taxonomy of 
privacy suffers from too much doctrine, and not enough dead bodies. It frames privacy 
harms in dry, analytical terms that fail to sufficiently identify and animate the compelling 
ways that privacy violations can negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human 
beings beyond simply provoking feelings of unease.”) 
172
  SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 4 (“As social-reputation 
shaping practices such as gossip and shaming migrate to the Internet, they are being 
transformed in significant ways.  Information that was once scattered, forgettable, and 
localized is becoming permanent and searchable.”); Jacqueline Lipton, “We, the 
Paparazzi”, supra note 129, at 983 (“…even if current Internet users’ apparent 
carelessness about personal information online is temporary, the effects of this carelessness 
may be widespread, permanent, and devastating because of the global and increasingly 
archival nature of today's online content. Coupled with the aggregation and 
decontextualization problems …, the ‘blip’ of unfortunate behavior today may have serious 
long-term consequences for many people.”) 
173
  Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ . 
174
  Id. 
175
  Id., at ___ (describing suicide of thirteen year old Megan Meier as a result of 
online bullying). 
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Roger Clementi are tragic cases in point.176  
 
In cases where online communications cause real physical harm, it is 
very difficult for law and policy makers to determine legal liability.  Which 
parties in the causal chain, if any, should ultimately be held responsible?  
One may think that the most obvious place to start in attaching legal 
liability is with the person who causes the actual physical damage.  
However, this will not always be effective in practice.  In the case of a 
suicide, for example, there is no physical attacker.  The victim kills herself 
as a result of online comments.   
 
Further, in the case of many physical assaults, the physical perpetrator 
of the harm may have been misled and may not have intended to cause any 
real damage.  In the case of a fraudulent rape fantasy notice like the one 
posted on Craigslist, for example, the perpetrator of the physical attack may 
think the victim’s protests are all just part of the act.  In strict liability torts 
and crimes, the intention of the physical attacker may be irrelevant.  
However, in cases where the state of mind of the defendant is relevant, this 
may significantly diminish remedies available to the victim with respect to 
the activities of the physical actor.   
 
Other than the physical actor, might liability attach to anyone else?  In 
cyberspace-related cases, the question arises as to whether the online actors 
who incited the physical harm should share any of the blame for the 
resulting harm.  The suicide of thirteen year old Megan Meier is an example 
of a devastating result in the physical world of morally reprehensible online 
conduct.  One of Meier’s classmate’s mothers, Lori Drew, created a false 
persona online – Josh Evans – to start a virtual relationship with Meier in 
order to find out if Meier would say anything negative about Drew’s 
daughter.177  Ultimately, Drew used the Evans persona to torture and 
humiliate Meier, ultimately saying that the world would be a better place 
without her.178   
 
As a result of Drew’s hurtful words in the guise of Evans, Meier 
committed suicide.  While Drew’s actions were clearly morally wrongful, 
particularly as she was aware that Meier suffered from depression,179 there 
was no clear basis of legal liability under which Drew could be held 
                                                 
176
  See following discussion. 
177
  Jacqueline Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___. 
178
  Id., at ___. 
179
  Id., at ___. 
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responsible.180  Federal prosecutors ultimately hinged their case on a fairly 
tortuous interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.181  This 
legislation was enacted in the early days of the personal computer 
revolution to criminalize computer hacking– described in the legislation in 
terms of exceeding authorized access to a computer system.182   
 
In an attempt to apply the legislation to Drew’s actions, prosecutors 
argued that Drew had exceeded her authorized access to the MySpace 
computer system in creating the fake Josh Evans persona because 
MySpace’s terms of service prohibited false identities.183  The prosecutors’ 
interpretation of the legislation failed because the judge was concerned that 
such a reading of the statute would render it void for vagueness.184  In the 
court’s view, it would be too difficult for anyone to be expected to know all 
the terms of service of the various online platforms to which they 
subscribed, sufficiently to avoid serious criminal liability.185 
 
In the case of the suicide of eighteen year old Tyler Clementi in New 
Jersey, courts will be faced with arguments in favor of novel applications of 
state hate crimes laws in order to hold Clementi’s roommate and another 
student criminally responsible for Clementi’s death.186  Clementi’s 
                                                 
180
  Id., at ___. 
181
 18 U.S.C. §§  1030(a)(2)(C) & 1030(c)(2)(A) (relating to accessing a computer 
system without authorization or in excess of authorization); United States v Drew, 259 
F.R.D. 449 (2009). 
182
  18 U.S.C. §§  1030(a)(2)(C) & 1030(c)(2)(A). 
183
  Andrew M Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt:  A Modern Makeover Expands 
Missouri’s Harassment Law to Include Electronic Communications, 74 MO. L REV 379, 
393 (2009). 
184
  United States v Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (2009) (“The pivotal issue herein is 
whether basing a CFAA misdemeanor violation as per 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and 
1030(c)(2)(A) upon the conscious violation of a website's terms of service runs afoul of the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine. This Court concludes that it does primarily because of the 
absence of minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, but also because of actual notice 
deficiencies.  ….[T]erms of service which are incorporated into a browsewrap or clickwrap 
agreement can, like any other type of contract, define the limits of authorized access as to a 
website and its concomitant computer/server(s). However, the question is whether 
individuals of ‘common intelligence’ are on notice that a breach of a terms of service 
contract can become a crime under the CFAA. Arguably, they are not.”). 
185
  Id., at  467 (“In sum, if any conscious breach of a website's terms of service is held 
to be sufficient by itself to constitute intentionally accessing a computer without 
authorization or in excess of authorization, the result will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) 
becomes a law that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens 
who wish to use the [Internet].’”)  
186
  John Culhane, More than the Victims: A Population-Based, Public Health 
Approach to Bullying of LGBT Youth, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 1 (describing the limitations of 
current legislation in addressing bullying in situations like that involving Clementi’s 
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roommate and the other student outed Clementi online by recording 
homosexual encounters involving Clementi in his dorm room and posting 
them online.187 
 
Courts and legislators are now faced with issues of how to attach blame 
to moral wrongs committed online that lead to grave physical harm in the 
real world.  There is currently great uncertainty as to which existing laws 
might apply to these kinds of situations and, indeed, whether any current 
laws are appropriately applied.  It is likely that new tort and criminal laws 
will need to be developed to tackle these challenges in the future.188  The 
cyberlaw field is a good place to initiate inquiries about how to fit these 
online wrongs into the legal matrix, and to develop substantive torts and 
crimes that fit the moral wrongs currently ocurring online. 
 
C.  Quantifying Damage 
 
Another challenge for cyberlaw in cases where novel kinds of harms 
occur online is the problem of quantifying damages or ascertaining other 
effective remedies.  Many standard legal remedies – such as damages and 
injunctions - do not work particularly well online.  Injunctions are not 
effective because it is impossible to meaningfully remove harmful 
information from the Internet.  There is a disturbingly permanent quality to 
online information.189  An order to remove information from one website, or 
even from multiple websites, will not result in the removal of the 
information from the Internet entirely.  Additionally, it is difficult to 
quantify a damages order that can make a plaintiff whole where that 
plaintiff is likely to suffer consequences of the online damage for the rest of 
her life due to the permanent and global quality of online information. 
 
Of course, one might argue that society will eventually stop taking 
notice of online information, particularly information from an individual’s 
                                                                                                                            
Suicide). 
187
  Id., at para. 2 (“Tyler Clementi is dead because the internet dissemination of videos 
showing him in an intimate setting with another man was too much for him to bear. He 
jumped off the George Washington Bridge.”) 
188
  Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, supra note 99, at ___ (advocating legal 
reform alongside developments in other regulatory mechanisms such as social norms and 
market forces to protect individuals from online bullying and harassment). 
189
  Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”, supra note 129, at 977 (describing the impossibility 
of removing all iterations of a given image from the Internet); SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION, supra note 166, at 4 (“Information that was once scattered, forgettable, and 
localized is becoming permanent and searchable.”) 
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distant past.190  The argument runs that because eventually everyone will 
have something embarrassing online, it will become the norm to expect this 
kind of information and to ignore it.191  One may also argue that an 
aggrieved person should be responsible for pro-actively making access to 
damaging information more difficult even if it cannot be completely 
eradicated from the Internet.  For example, the victim could utilize a service 
like Reputation.com to help sanitize her online reputation.192  Assuming that 
society becomes more blasé about online reputation and that individuals can 
act to protect their own online reputations, there may ultimately be no role 
for the law in this context.   
 
That may be true for the future.  However, at the present time people are 
losing jobs and suffering reputational and emotional damage as a result of 
morally questionable online postings.193  Today’s law should play a role in 
protecting those damaged by harmful online communications.  Current 
caseloads demonstrate that private individuals are relying on the law to 
vindicate their personal reputations and emotional well being.  The recent 
AutoAdmit litigation in the United States is a case in point.194  In this case, 
two female law students refused to stand by while they were embarrassed, 
defamed, and humiliated on a bulletin board.195  The British case involving 
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Max Mosley, the wealthy Formula One magnate, is another example of a 
plaintiff suing for reputational and emotional damage caused by online and 
offline breaches of his privacy.196  The Mosley case in particular involved a 
detailed examination of the problem of quantifying damages in the case of 
emotional and reputational harm outside of the more common defamation 
context.197    
 
It is not the aim of this article to resolve issues of how to quantify and 
remedy online harms.  The aim is rather to demonstrate the necessity of 
accepting and reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a field within which these 
kinds of issues can be debated.  By understanding the nature of the Internet 
as focusing on global intermediated information exchanges, one can begin 
to better understand the challenges inherent in developing legal principles 
appropriate to the online world.  The manner in which people communicate 
online, the global extent of those communications, their permanent quality, 
and the specific types of harms that may result are all bound up with the 
nature of cyberspace itself.  We need a clear theoretical framework within 
which to study these unique aspects of the Internet in order to develop 
appropriate rules for identifying and remedying online wrongs.  Cyberlaw is 
the appropriate forum for these debates. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
This article contends that cyberlaw is not, and arguably never should 
have been, dismissed as a “law of the horse”.  While it was unclear in the 
early days of the Internet how the field would develop in terms of 
substance, it is much clearer now that cyberlaw is, and should remain, a 
distinct field.  The benefits of recognizing and developing cyberlaw as a 
field derive from the fact that there are aspects of the Internet that create 
unique legal challenges.  The Internet is, above all else, a tool for global 
communications.  All Internet interactions are information exchanges, and 
all of those exchanges are enabled by one or more intermediaries.  Most of 
these exchanges have a permanent and global quality that can ultimately 
result in significant personal and reputational harms. 
 
A field of cyberlaw will comprise legal issues that arise out of the 
unique nature of the Internet.  It will include a detailed consideration of the 
legal responsibilities of Internet intermediaries of all kinds and in many 
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contexts.  However, it must also incorporate jurisdictional considerations, 
the relationship between legal rules and online norms, the identification of 
remediable online harms, and the ability to develop effective and apropriate 
remedies for those harms.  The cyberlaw field will overlap with other more 
traditional bodies of law such as tort, contract, criminal law, constitutional 
law, and intellectual property law.  However, a consideration of problems 
common to the Internet within the cyberlaw field will lead to more 
principled, systematic and effective legal developments.   
 
While debates about the nature of cyberspace and about the ability of 
national governments effectively to regulate cyberspace have continued 
since the dawn of the Internet, the debate about the nature of cyberlaw as a 
field has stalled.  It is now time to revive this debate.  The Web 2.0 era has 
broadened the reach of the Internet by enhancing how, and how often, we 
interact online.  We are no longer relatively passive consumers of online 
information.  Rather, we increasingly participate in creation and 
dissemination of content, often causing harm to others in the process.  As 
more and more people interact with each other online at an exponential rate, 
it is imperative that a cyberlaw field can be developed and organized in a 
way that reflects the realities of the Web 2.0 generation.  Whatever the 
nature of cyberlaw in the past, it is now time for a Cyberlaw 2.0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
